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INTRODUCTION 
•    At 38.8 million,1 the U.S. Hispanic population is already 
larger than the entire population of Canada.2 
•    Univision concedes “that there is no company as dominant 
in English-language media as Univision is in Spanish.”3 
•    “[T]he Communications Act prohibits [the FCC] from 
‘granting a monopoly in the field of broadcasting,’ and [it 
is] directed instead to serve the ‘public interest’ by 
‘assuring fair opportunity for open competition in the use 
of broadcasting facilities.’”4 
In reviewing media mergers, the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”) has long recognized the 
dangers of media consolidation and its negative effects on 
competition, localism and diversity.  However, in approving 
Univision’s request to combine its Spanish-language television 
assets with Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation’s (“HBC”) radio 
assets (“Univision merger”), it has permitted a Spanish-media 
giant to form.  Although the combined entity does not command a 
monopoly in the broad national market, and affects only Spanish-
speaking audiences, the new entity dominates the U.S. Spanish-
language market, dwarfing all competitors. 
This Note argues that the FCC failed in its regulatory duty to 
serve the public interest by granting the merger.  To properly 
achieve the public interest goals of competition, localism and 
diversity, the FCC should have considered language as a factor in 
defining the media market affected by the Univision merger.  A 
 
 1 Haya El Nasser, 39 Million Make Hispanics Largest U.S. Minority Group, USA 
TODAY, June 19, 2003, at A1.  The Census has used the term “Hispanic” to designate the 
Spanish-speaking population in the United States, so I have chosen to do so as well.  
Johnny Diaz, Latino? Hispanic? Which Is It? Spanish Speakers Are Divided and Often 
Confused, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2004, at 1. 
 2 Entravision Commun. Corp., U.S. Hispanic Market, at 
http://www.entravision.com/template.cfm?page=hispanics (last visited Oct. 8, 2004). 
 3 Mireya Navarro, As Univision Looks to Buy Into Radio, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2003) 
at C8. 
 4 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, ¶ 54, at 13637–38 (proposed 
June 2, 2003) (citing U.S. v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956)) [hereinafter 
Biennial Review 2002]. 
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market definition based on language would have been consistent 
with Commission precedent.  Had the FCC acknowledged that 
language plays a part in the diversification of voices in media 
ownership, the merger decision would have been different.  The 
adverse consequences of the FCC’s failure will only become more 
apparent as America’s Hispanic population grows.  The FCC 
cannot ignore that this population will be severely impacted by the 
merger. 
This Note has three parts.  Part I.A provides a legal framework 
for the FCC’s review of broadcast license transfers through the 
broadcast ownership rules, which inform its assessment of media 
mergers.  Part I.B traces the evolution of the FCC’s foreign-
language media regulation, including examples of cases in which 
the FCC used language as a determinative factor in its decision.  
Part I.C describes the current marketplace of Spanish-language 
television and radio entities and how Spanish-language audiences 
use these media outlets.  Part II recounts how the FCC and the 
Department of Justice reviewed the Univision merger.  Despite the 
Justice Department’s finding that Spanish-language radio does not 
compete with English-language radio, the FCC proceeded with a 
market definition excluding language.  Part III demonstrates that 
the FCC’s approval of the Univision merger did not advance the 
public interest in competition, localism and diversity.  This Note 
concludes that Spanish-language media is a discrete media market, 
a distinction that federal regulation should fully recognize. 
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MEDIA 
Part I will detail the FCC’s methods for reviewing media 
mergers and the unique history of foreign-language media 
regulation.  Part I.A will illustrate the scope of the FCC’s authority 
to regulate media mergers through the broadcast ownership rules 
and will define the statutory mandate that mergers benefit the 
public interest.  “The public interest” is a term of art that has long 
been the governing principle of FCC regulation, despite its opaque 
meaning.  Since mergers often implicate antitrust laws, Part I.A 
will also detail the parallel competition reviews carried out by the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.  Part I.B 
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will demonstrate the use of language as a determinative factor in 
prior FCC decisions.  Part I.C will show how Spanish-language 
media is used in America today and which corporate players define 
the broadcast arena. 
A. How the FCC Reviews Media Mergers 
The FCC reviews media mergers by the authority granted to 
oversee broadcast licenses in the Communications Act of 1934.5  
When applying for a license, a broadcaster must meet “citizenship, 
character, and financial, technical and other qualifications . . . to 
operate the station.”6  Even if the license applicant meets the basic 
criteria, the FCC must determine whether the applicant meets 
certain qualitative standards and if granting the license “would best 
serve the public interest.”7  Since broadcast licenses are limited in 
supply, mergers are accomplished by broadcast properties 
changing hands through license transfers.8  If a television 
broadcaster attempted to merge with a radio broadcaster, the FCC 
would focus its review on the transfer of licenses between the 
parties.  License transfers are permissible only when the 
Commission finds that the “public interest, convenience, and 
necessity will be served” by this action.9  Since the responsibility 
to serve the public interest is the crux of the FCC’s duty in 
broadcast licensing (and therefore media mergers), it is critical to 
understand how the public interest has been defined by courts. 
 
 5 KENNETH CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 130, 135 (4th ed. 
2003) (noting the process and requirements under the Communications Act of 1934 for 
how to obtain a broadcast license and the FCC’s jurisdiction over sales of licenses). 
 6 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (2004). 
 7 DONALD E. LIVELY, ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW 151 (1992). 
 8 CREECH, supra note 5, at 130 (stating that sales of broadcast licenses for existing 
facilities are more common). 
 9 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2004).  In general, license transfers are governed by the same 
standard as new applications or license renewals, but there are additional considerations 
that the FCC will review in transfers alone. LIVELY, supra note 7, at 173.  The FCC has 
regulations for the frequency of transfers, requiring the broadcaster to hold the license for 
a specific waiting period before transferring ownership to another. Id. 
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1. The Public Interest 
What constitutes “the public interest” has long been 
debated10—a battle complicated by shifting meanings of the phrase 
in different contexts and at different times in history.  However, the 
FCC’s ability to regulate in “the public interest” in broadcast 
licensing was first given power and import in the 1943 case, NBC 
v. United States.11  NBC argued that the FCC’s regulatory authority 
was limited only to “technical and engineering” matters and that 
the FCC did not have the authority to implement competition-
based, broadcasting regulations over the national radio networks.12  
The Supreme Court held that the FCC was more than “a kind of 
traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent stations from 
interfering with each other.”13  In the Court’s view, the 
Commission “was given a comprehensive mandate to ‘encourage 
the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.’”14  
This case confirmed that the Commission had broad, 
congressionally-authorized power to regulate the broadcast 
spectrum.15 
Since NBC, the FCC has focused its broadcast regulation on 
three areas it determined to be central to the public interest: 
diversity, competition, and localism.16  Since media regulation 
 
 10 See 3 HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 14.1, at 115–
17 (West Prac. ed. 1999 & Supp. 2003) (noting that the public interest standard adopted 
into the Communications Act was “borrowed” from the Transportation Act of 1920 
relating to railroad regulation and since that time has been debated as to its meaning). 
 11 T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE, 
REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 71 (5th ed. 1999). 
 12 Id.  The FCC was concerned that national radio networks had too much control over 
the industry and local programming, therefore the FCC created the chain broadcasting 
rules to govern the relationship between the local affiliated radio stations and the radio 
networks. Id. at 71, 666.  The rules were in place until 1977 when it was determined that 
with the amount of existing competition they were no longer necessary in radio. Id. at 
668. 
 13 NBC v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 215–16 (1943). 
 14 Id. at 219 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(g)(i) (1943)). 
 15 Id. at 219 (suggesting that the Communications Act granted the Commission 
expansive powers). 
 16 Press Release, FCC, FCC Sets Limits on Media Concentration (June 2, 2003), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public (last visited Oct. 8, 2004). 
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seeks to “promote First Amendment interests of consumers”17 and 
the First Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public,”18 
diversity can be achieved through rules that “encourage diversity 
in the ownership of broadcast stations, which can in turn encourage 
a diversity of viewpoints in the material presented over the 
airwaves.”19  Diversity of viewpoints and sources “plac[es] into 
many, rather than a few hands, the control of this powerful medium 
of public communication.”20  Such diversification also augments 
competition since it “prevent[s] undue concentration of economic 
power.”21  Through the allotment of spectrum to local 
communities, the FCC assured that “good broadcasting” would 
develop all over the country such that New York and Chicago 
stations would not dominate the media.22  Broadcasters would 
fulfill this goal of localism by serving “the programming and 
advertising needs of the local community.”23  The Court in NBC 
stated that “[l]ocal program service is a vital part of community 
life,”24  and today it remains a key goal upheld by courts, Congress 
 
 17 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 17 F.C.C.R. 18503, ¶ 30, at 18515 (proposed 
Sept. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Biennial Review 2002 NPRM]. 
 18 Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in 
Local Markets, 16 F.C.C.R. 19861, ¶ 5, at 19863 (proposed Nov. 8, 2001) (citing 
Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating 
to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Report and 
Order, 45 F.C.C. 1476, ¶ 3, at 1477 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))). 
 19 Biennial Review 2002 NPRM, supra note 17, ¶ 30, at 18515. 
 20 Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission Rules 
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 22 
F.C.C.2d 206, 310 (1970). 
 21 FCC v. NCCB, 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978). 
 22 Biennial Review 2002, supra note 4, ¶ 74, at 13643. 
 23 Gregory Prindle, Note, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has Diminished 
Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279, 
290 (2003) (describing the localism as expressed by the Court and Commission in the 
NBC case).  One of the concerns raised in the NBC case was that local broadcasting 
could suffer if a high percentage of a station’s programming came from a national source. 
Id. 
 24 Biennial Review 2002, supra note 4, ¶ 76 at 13644 (quoting NBC v. United States, 
319 U.S. 190, 203 (1943)). 
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and the Commission.25  As a result, the broadcast ownership rules 
promulgated by the Commission, including those issued as 
recently as 2003, remain premised on these central and historic 
principles of competition, localism and diversity.26 
2. Broadcast Ownership Rules 
The FCC regulates broadcast ownership because “broadcasters 
are essentially trustees of the public’s airwaves [and] government 
is the guardian of the public’s interests.” 27  Ownership, therefore, 
is central to broadcasters’ use of the “public’s airwaves” which the 
FCC must oversee.28  From its earliest days, the FCC developed a 
regulatory scheme for ownership according to its public interest 
mandate (focused on competition, localism and diversity).  It 
established rules which defined specific limits to the number of 
broadcast entities one can own on a national and local level29 to 
maintain competition, localism and diversity in broadcast 
ownership.  As a corollary, the FCC can deny a license transfer if 
the resultant merged entity would violate these ownership limits30 
because the transfer would be contrary to the public interest.31  
Although the initial broadcast ownership rules focused on discrete 
media ownership (such as those embodied by the local television 
multiple ownership, local radio ownership, national television 
ownership, and dual television network rules),32 the FCC later 
developed cross-ownership holding limits between radio, broadcast 
television, cable television, and newspapers.33  With the passage of 
 
 25 Id. ¶¶ 73, 75, at 13643–44. 
 26 Id. ¶ 131, at 13677. 
 27 Krystilyn Corbett, The Rise Of Private Property Rights In The Broadcast Spectrum, 
46 DUKE L.J. 611, 613 (1996). 
 28 Id. 
 29 3 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 14.4, at 150 (discussing local 
ownership/duopoly and national ownership limits). 
 30 See id. § 14.6 at 220 (noting that the FCC can control licensing through hearings 
when licensees do not comply with FCC rules). 
 31 PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 7.5, at 624 (2d ed. 
1999 & Supp. 2003). 
 32 FCC, FCC’s Review of Broadcast Ownership Rules, 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/reviewrules.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004). 
 33 3 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 14.4, at 155–59.  Cross-ownership raised many 
of the same diversity issues that common ownership of broadcast stations raised. Id. at 
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the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecom Act”)34, Congress 
began requiring the FCC to review these ownership limits 
biennially to determine whether they remain necessary and in the 
public interest.35  The FCC issued new broadcast ownership rules 
in 2003 through the 2002 biennial review.36 
The longtime goals of competition, diversity and localism were 
upheld in the 2002 biennial review.  The FCC recognized there 
was still a need for competition review when license transfers 
occurred.37  It decided to use audience share as a gauge of 
competition in some circumstances, and in certain discrete markets 
to use competition in advertising markets as the measurement 
governing whether competition existed between companies.38  
Either way, the FCC committed itself to assess the competitive 
harm wrought on the public and not the merger’s effect on 
broadcasters or advertisers.39  The FCC determined that viewpoint 
diversity was still a critical goal40 and the best way to measure it 
was through news and public affairs programming.41  Viewpoint 
diversity included broadcast television, radio, cable and the 
internet.  Program diversity, including programming aimed at 
“minority and ethnic groups,” was important to broadcast 
ownership regulation, but the FCC argued that this would best be 
achieved by competition between media outlets rather than through 
 
156.  When the cross-ownership rules were put in place, “[ninety-four] television stations 
were owned in common with daily newspapers serving the same broadcast community,” 
which the FCC did not believe represented diversity of voices. Id. at 155–56. 
 34 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §502, 110 Stat. 133 
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 561) (2004). 
 35 2 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 9.3, at 347. 
 36 Biennial Review 2002, supra note 22.  The Commission reaffirmed their 
commitment to competition, localism and diversity in the 2002 biennial review. Id. ¶ 5, at 
13623.  The rules however were initially stayed by court action. Prometheus Radio 
Project v. FCC, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18390, at **3–4 (3d Cir. 2003).  Since then, they 
have been remanded in part to the Commission.  Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 
F.3d 372, 382 (3d Cir. 2004).  Congress has since amended the Telecom Act to provide 
for quadrennial review of the ownership rules.  Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 100 (2004). 
 37 Biennial Review 2002, supra note 4, ¶ 56 at 13368. 
 38 Id. ¶ 64, at 13641. 
 39 Id. ¶ 65, at 13641. 
 40 Id. ¶ 27, at 13630. 
 41 Id. ¶ 32, at 13631. 
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government regulation.42  Localism remained an important goal 
and would be measured by “selection of programming responsive 
to local needs and interests, and local news quality and quantity.”43 
However before the new rules could go into effect, they were 
challenged in court and the Third Circuit ordered a stay of 
judgment.44  Several consumer advocacy groups and broadcaster 
associations petitioned for judicial review of the new rules.45  In 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, the Third Circuit agreed that 
the rules promulgated under the 2002 biennial review were 
problematic.46  The rules were in part remanded to the 
Commission47 and the stay of judgment remains in effect until the 
court reviews the FCC’s action on remand.48  As a result, the new 
rules have not yet gone into effect and the Third Circuit 
undermined many of the new policy arguments espoused by the 
FCC in the 2002 biennial review. 
3. Competition and Antitrust 
Even though the rules are in flux, the Commission’s public 
interest review still involves competition matters which also 
implicates antitrust laws.  Consequently, there is some overlap 
between the FCC’s authority in this regard and those of other 
executive and independent agencies, which hold more general 
oversight in antitrust matters.  Sometimes a merger that is 
permissible under antitrust laws may not be permissible when the 
FCC considers the public interest.49  Multiple agency review of 
 
 42 Id. ¶ 36, at 13631. 
 43 Id. ¶ 78, at 13644. 
 44 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18390, at **3–4 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
 45 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 381–82 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 46 Id. at 397. 
 47 The remand was premised on the grounds that the Commission made “an unjustified 
assumption that media outlets of same type make an equal contribution to diversity and 
competition in local markets” and “its decision to count the Internet as a source of 
viewpoint diversity, while discounting cable, was not rational.”  Id. at 435, 405. 
 48 Id. at 435. 
 49 Cavanagh, infra note 53, at 71 (noting that traditionally the FCC broadcast 
ownership rules were more restrictive in radio than antitrust but with the relaxing of radio 
rules in the Telecom Act, antitrust does again play an important role); see also James 
Rowley & Katherine Reynolds Lewis, NBC Clears FTC Antitrust Hurdle to Buy 
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media mergers is often necessary and even advantageous as the 
Supreme Court recently noted that FCC regulation can work in 
tandem with antitrust enforcement to benefit overall competition.50  
Since FCC regulations establish a baseline for competition in a 
market, broadcasters would not bother to attempt a merger and 
seek antitrust review when they are in violation of FCC ownership 
regulations. 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) will review mergers through their antitrust 
and competition mandates, respectively,51 but their reviews are 
limited.  DOJ merger reviews focus only on economic factors52 
including “market concentration, market conditions, the acquiring 
firm’s entry advantage, market share of the acquired firm, and 
efficiencies.”53  The DOJ is “‘required to approve mergers unless 
they substantially lessen competition.’”54  The FTC can take non-
economic factors into consideration and “act[ing] as a ‘court of 
equity’ . . . disapprove a merger based on public policy grounds.”55  
However, antitrust agencies will only review large media 
 
Telemundo TV: Network Still Must Obtain FCC Approval for Purchase of the Spanish-
Language Broadcaster, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, § 3, at 11. 
 50 Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872, 881 
(2004). 
 51 CREECH, supra note 5, at 376.  In 2002, the FTC and DOJ planned to establish clear 
guidelines for reviewing mergers, but abandoned the effort when Congress expressed 
opposition. ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 84–85 (Found. Press 2003). 
 52 Mike Harrington, Note, A-B-C, See You Real Soon: Broadcast Media Mergers and 
Ensuring a “Diversity of Voices,” 38 B.C. L. REV. 497, 539 (1997). 
 53 Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, The Game of Radiopoly: An Antitrust Perspective of 
Consolidation in the Radio Industry, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 478 (2000) (noting the 
economic factors the DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines address).  The DOJ uses the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which requires defining the “relevant product and 
geographic markets” at issue, to govern its analysis of radio mergers. Edward D. 
Cavanagh, Symposium: Are New Media Really Replacing Old Media?  Broadcast Media 
Deregulation and the Internet: Deregulation of the Air Waves: Is Antitrust Enough?, 17 
ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 67, 72 (2003).  Once the markets are defined, the DOJ 
seeks to determine the likely competitive effects of the merger. Id. at 72.  With radio 
mergers, the DOJ concentrates its inquiry into whether the proposed merger will “lead to 
increased prices for radio advertising.”  See also Part II.A.  But see text accompanying 
note 246 (noting relevant product market for Univision merger was Spanish-language 
radio advertising). 
 54 HUBER ET AL., supra note 31, at 603 (quoting Worldcom, 13 F.C.C.R. 18025, ¶ 14, at 
18034–35 (1998)). 
 55 Harrington, supra note 52, at 539. 
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mergers.56  Therefore some license transfers may not receive any 
antitrust scrutiny at all.57  Regardless of the merger’s size, the FCC 
will ensure the license transfer meets the goals of diversity, 
localism and competition.58  One court expressed its concern that if 
license transfers were left to antitrust agencies alone, eighty-five 
percent of media mergers since 2000 would not have been 
reviewed by anyone.59  But since the FCC makes a public interest 
inquiry these smaller (but no less critical) mergers were 
examined.60 
Since the FCC is concerned with the merger being in the public 
interest and thereby promoting competition and diversity,61 it will 
take into consideration antitrust principles in its competitive 
analysis “but it is not governed by the scope of the antitrust 
laws.”62  The FCC’s review process is also open and subject to 
public examination.  The FCC must present a well-reasoned public 
record of its decision63 and must also respond to petitions to deny, 
filed by members of the public, that raise “specific allegations of 
fact sufficient to show that . . . a grant of the application would be 
prima facie inconsistent with [the public interest].”64  As a result, 
the FCC must approach each license transfer taking into 
consideration public suggestions and comments. 
 
 56 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 414 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the 
DOJ and FTC require notice of a merger only if “the transaction exceeds $200 million or 
if the assets of one party exceed $10 million and the assets of the other party exceed $100 
million”). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Leeper, supra note 53 at 477. 
 62 HUBER ET AL., supra note 31, at 624 (quoting Teleport/AT&T, 13 F.C.C.R. at 15, 
243-15, 244 ¶ 12 (citing FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc. 346 U.S. 86, 94 (1953); 
United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 81–82, 88 (1980))). 
 63 HUBER ET AL., supra note 31, at 145–46 n.91.  The DOJ and FTC can operate their 
investigations “largely hidden from the public view” and their decisions do not require 
substantive explanation. Id 
 64 Telemundo Communications Group, 17 F.C.C.R. 6958, ¶ 7, 6962 (2002) (quoting 
Citizens for Jazz on WRVR, Inc. v. FCC, 775 F.2d 392, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing 47 
U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1982))). 
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B. Foreign-Language Media Regulation 
From the earliest days of the Federal Radio Commission, the 
predecessor agency to the FCC, foreign-language media has drawn 
the attention of government regulators.65  Part I.B will demonstrate 
that throughout the Commission’s history foreign-language media 
has been treated differently from English-language due to unique 
language-driven concerns.  This part will show that the FCC has 
often used language as a factor in making its decisions, whether the 
rulings involve the program format of a radio station, approval of 
media mergers, or the granting of special privileges to Spanish-
language broadcasters.  The FCC’s record proves that language has 
been used as a determinative tool to ensure that broadcasters serve 
the public interest. 
1. Community Need as a Public Interest Priority 
The FCC has charged broadcasters with the mission to serve 
their local communities, a goal broadcasters have leveraged to 
provide foreign-language programming to local foreign-language 
audiences.66  The Commission has in turn recognized language as a 
factor that can determine a community’s need for foreign-language 
broadcasting.67 
The FCC noted that in a 1931 decision called the Brooklyn 
Cases68 the Radio Commission had approved of the meritorious 
practice of “the broadcast of foreign language programs where 
they were designed to educate and instruct the foreign populace 
among its listening public in the principles and ideals of our 
Government and American institutions.”69  Early on, the FCC 
accepted that the “specialized nature” of foreign-language 
programming could serve the public interest if “(a) a need for such 
 
 65 Michael E. Lewyn, When is Time Brokerage A Transfer of Control? The FCC’s 
Regulation of Local Marketing Agreements and the Need for Rulemaking, 6 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1995) (noting that “brokered foreign language 
programs were common in large markets before the 1934 Communications Act”). 
 66 See generally Part I.B.1. 
 67 See generally Part I.B.1. 
 68 U.S. Broad. Corp. (WARD), 2 F.C.C. 208 n.1 (1936) [hereinafter Brooklyn Cases I].  
The dispute involved four radio stations in Brooklyn, NY in 1932. Id. at 213. 
 69 Id. at 223 (citing application of WJKS). 
SERRATORE 1/25/2005  6:15 PM 
216 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:203 
service was shown to exist, and (b) the programming proposed was 
designed for the purpose of meeting the unfulfilled need.”70  What 
constituted suitable foreign-language programming in the public 
interest was based on several factors: 
[First, what] percentage of the population to be served . . . 
can be expected to comprehend the foreign tongue[; 
second, what] percentage of the station’s total programming 
[will] be devoted to foreign languages[; third the control 
the licensee] exert[s] over the content of the foreign-
language programs[; fourth,] the number of other radio and 
television services available in the area.71 
The FCC used this formula in the seminal 1965 La Fiesta 
proceeding when faced with a choice between two proposed 
Spanish-language stations in a Texas community.72  A pair of 
broadcasters were vying for a license in Lubbock, Texas: La Fiesta 
proposed a full-time Spanish-language broadcast service, whereas 
Mid-Cities proposed a part-time Spanish-language service.73  To 
determine community need, the FCC looked to census statistics on 
the Spanish-surnamed population in the area.74  The FCC also took 
testimony from people in “public health, welfare, education, 
religion and government” who worked closely with the local 
Latino population.75  From these local experts, the Commission 
determined that “English language broadcasts on matters relating 
to civic affairs, voting and news [were] less effective than 
programs broadcast in Spanish” for this community.76  No other 
radio stations served the Spanish-language community at the 
time.77  Mid-Cities had proposed religious, agricultural and black 
 
 70 Earnest & Flache, 6 F.C.C.2d. 65, ¶ 5, 67 (1965). 
 71 Great Lakes Television Inc., 25 F.C.C. 470, ¶ 54, at 526 (1958). 
 72 Earnest & Flache, 6 F.C.C.2d. 65, ¶¶ 1–2, at 65–66 (1965).  Two mutually-exclusive 
applicants sought to build a radio station in Lubbock, TX and the FCC conducted a 
comparative hearing to determine which proposed service would best serve the public 
interest, necessity and convenience. Id. ¶ 1, at 65. 
 73 Id. ¶ 1, at 65. 
 74 Id. ¶ 7, at 69. 
 75 Id. ¶ 8, at 68–69. 
 76 Id. ¶ 8, at 69. 
 77 Id. ¶ 10, at 70. 
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programming with the part-time Spanish programming.78  While 
there appeared to be a need for additional programming towards 
the black community, the Commission found sufficient alternative 
offerings for religious programming and no critical need for 
agricultural programming.79  In the end, the FCC favored the full-
time programming for the Spanish-language community since the 
language barrier otherwise deprived them of accessing any 
broadcast programming in the area.80  Thus, the full-time Spanish 
programming would “better serve the public interest.”81  This FCC 
decision demonstrated that foreign-language programming could 
be found in the public interest where there was community need. 
Though the FCC created a formula to weigh community need, 
it lacked “a guiding statement of general policy” towards the 
merits of foreign-language programming overall.82  The FCC had 
made “local self-expression” and “service to minority groups” 
public interest broadcasting priorities.83  The FCC claimed that 
local foreign-language community need was inherent in its goal of 
“service to minority groups,”84 but there existed no separate and 
distinct policy to oversee foreign-language broadcasting. 
2. Program Format Disputes 
The FCC’s failure to establish a foreign-language broadcasting 
policy created a tension between cases that dealt with community 
need and cases where a broadcaster sought to change a format of a 
television or radio station to foreign-language programming.  
 
 78 Id. ¶ 12, at 71. 
 79 Id. ¶¶ 13–15, at 72. 
 80 Id. ¶15, at 72. 
 81 Id. ¶ 25, at 77. 
 82 Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 5 F.C.C.2d 71, 72 (1966) (concurring statement of 
Commissioner Johnson). 
 83 Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard: The 
Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 615 (1998) (describing the “major 
elements usually necessary to meet the public interest”). 
 84 Licensee Responsibility to Exercise Adequate Control over Foreign Language 
Programs, 39 F.C.C.2d. 1037, ¶ 7, 1039 (1973).  The licensees also have an affirmative 
duty to “ascertain the problems and needs of significant groups in their communities and 
to provide programming responsive to those needs.” New Mexico Broad. Co., 87 
F.C.C.2d. 213, § D, 269 (1981) (dissenting statement of Commissioner Joseph R. Fogarty 
citing 1960 Policy Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960)). 
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Spanish-language radio and television have often been referred to 
as merely an entertainment format, like talk radio or classical 
music.  The FCC has avoided regulation of entertainment formats 
since the 1970’s, due to First Amendment concerns.85  In the late 
1960’s and early 1970’s, the Commission was faced with a number 
of cases that brought to the forefront a burgeoning dispute between 
the listening habits of the public and government’s role in 
regulating programming.86  The FCC did not want to oversee 
format changes of its broadcasters because of “the difficulty of 
objectively evaluating the strength of listener preferences, of 
comparing the desire for diversity within a particular type of 
programming to the desire for a broader range of program formats 
and of assessing the financial feasibility of a unique format.”87  It 
argued that the market was “far more flexible than governmental 
regulation and responds more quickly to changing public tastes.”88  
In response to these cases, the FCC established a policy89 to leave 
entertainment format regulation to the market.90  The policy was 
challenged in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild in the Supreme 
Court.91  The Supreme Court in deference to the Commission let 
 
 85 ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION, 145–69 (3rd 
ed. St. Martin’s Press 1982) (detailing the history of the entertainment format debate at 
the Commission and in the courts).  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Commission 
was faced with cases that brought to the forefront a burgeoning dispute between the 
listening habits of the public and government’s role in regulating programming. Id.; see, 
e.g., Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(radio format changed from progressive rock to a “middle of the road” format); 
Lakewood Broad. Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (radio format 
changed from all news to country and western); Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (a radio station format change from a classical music station to a 
blended program).  
 86 KRASNOW, supra note 85, at 145–69. 
 87 FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 590 (1981) (noting Dev. of Policy re: 
Changes in the Entm’t Formats of Broad. Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 862–64 (Jul. 28, 
1976)). 
 88 Id. at 590. 
 89 Dev. of Policy re: Changes in the Entm’t Formats of Broad. Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 
858 (Jul. 28, 1976). 
 90 The policy stated: “the marketplace is the best way to allocate entertainment formats 
in radio, whether the hoped for result is expressed in First Amendment terms (i.e., 
promoting the greatest diversity of listening choices for the public) or in economic terms 
(i.e., maximizing the welfare of consumers of radio programs).”  Id. ¶ 16, at 863. 
 91 WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 588–91. 
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the policy stand;92 however it cautioned the FCC that its 
application was too broad suggesting that “the Commission should 
be alert to the consequences of its policies and should stand ready 
to alter its rule if necessary to serve the public interest more 
fully.”93  The Supreme Court required that the FCC act and not just 
defer to the market forces if the public interest is better served by 
regulating an entertainment format dispute. 
This debate over entertainment formats prevented a broadcaster 
from offering a Spanish-language radio program in Arizona in 
1971.  KEVT, a Tucson-based, English-language radio station, 
sought to expand and offer night-time Spanish-language 
programming.94  The request involved a more powerful radio 
signal which, in turn, required a waiver from the FCC to grant a 
more powerful signal for the station.95  A night-time service waiver 
is granted when a licensee promises first primary service96 to at 
least 25% of the area or at least 25% of the population residing 
therein.97  KEVT alleged that it could prove a substantial portion of 
the population spoke Spanish and would be served by the new 
service.98  In light of the FCC’s policy that Spanish-language radio 
was only an entertainment format, the FCC was hesitant to grant 
the waiver solely because of the “specialized nature of [the] 
proposed programming.”99  However, when the D.C. Circuit 
reviewed this waiver request, it found a dramatic distinction based 
on the foreign-language aspect of the proposal, stating that “there 
 
 92 The Supreme Court found that “the Commission ha[d] not forsaken its obligation to 
pursue the public interest [in this matter].  On the contrary, [the Commission] ha[d] 
assessed the benefits and the harm likely to flow from Government review of 
entertainment programming, and on balance ha[d] concluded that its statutory duties are 
best fulfilled by not attempting to oversee format changes.” FCC v. WNCN Listeners 
Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 595 (1981). 
 93 Id. at 603. 
 94 Tucson Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.2d 1380, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 95 Id. 
 96 The “first primary service requirement was adopted . . . in recognition of the 
principle that each new nighttime assignment inevitably degrades the service areas of 
unlimited-time cochannel stations and precludes possible future cochannel nighttime 
operations over a wide area.” Champaign Nat’l Bank, 22 F.C.C.2d 790, ¶4, 791 (Apr. 29, 
1970). 
 97 Tucson Radio, Inc, 452 F.2d at 1381. 
 98 Id. at 1382. 
 99 Id. at 1382 n.1. 
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is a crucial difference between failure to serve a group which 
cannot understand the language broadcasted, and a failure to reach 
a group which chooses not to listen because of program 
content.”100  The court suggested that the circumstances at issue 
with KEVT were “unique” and that interpreting the rule in favor of 
KEVT would not result in a “flood of applications for licenses” 
whereby a group could demand service because it could prove a 
substantial portion of the listening audience would prefer to hear 
particular content, say, classical music, and it was not being 
served.101  The DC Circuit viewed the KEVT waiver request as 
more than a format change, since language was a critical 
determinative factor in audience access to the format.  The FCC 
conceded that “[i]f a substantial segment of the community thinks 
and speaks in the Spanish language only, and cannot understand 
the English language, the broadcast stations in that area must be 
responsive to this fact.”102  The FCC agreed to consider foreign-
language as a critical factor in future waivers of this service rule.103  
Format changes are still left to market forces, however the FCC 
demonstrated in the KEVT decision that “Spanish” was more than 
merely a format and viewed foreign-language programming as 
serving the community need. 
3. Broadcast Ownership 
Despite such a commitment to serving community need, the 
FCC has denied that language is a factor it considers in ownership 
decisions.  However, this policy has been inconsistently applied.  
In the 1995 Spanish Radio Network decision, the Commission 
determined that language was neither a factor in ownership 
 
 100 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Tucson Radio Inc., 35 F.C.C.2d. 584, ¶ 6, 585 (June 20, 1972).  The FCC stated that: 
[I]f a petitioner can show (i) that a substantial segment of the community 
speaks exclusively a language other than English; (ii) a need exists for aural 
broadcast service in that language; (iii) that none of the existing stations would 
serve this need; and (iv) that the prospects for obtaining such service by resort 
to existing Commission remedies are poor, the Commission would then 
entertain a petition for waiver of its primary service rule.   
Id. ¶ 6, at 585–86. 
 103 Id. ¶ 6, at 585–86. 
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regulation nor a factor for defining the market for the radio transfer 
application.104  The petitioners, a group from the Florida Cuban 
community, argued that the transfer of ownership of a Miami radio 
station to Heftel105 violated the local radio ownership rules106 
because the definition of the market for purposes of the ownership 
rule was “Spanish radio.”107  The petitioners contended that the 
relevant market for public interest review could be defined by 
language, because the ownership rules were supposed to extend 
beyond regular antitrust concerns and focus on the diversity of 
voices.108  The Commission disagreed with the petitioners: 
“[A]lthough Spanish speakers may be perceived by those seeking 
to reach them as a distinct market, the multiple ownership rules are 
not geared toward such a market definition.”109  According to the 
FCC, the multiple ownership rules use the term “market” as the 
equivalent of audience share.110  The Commission argued that 
radio markets, as defined by Arbitron,111 are not distinguished 
based on language.112  The FCC did not flatly refuse a potential re-
reading of the rules, but said that to derive a different definition 
would require a rulemaking to “change its current multiple 
ownership rules and policies.”113  The FCC appeared receptive to 
the concept of language as a factor in ownership decisions, 
however it was unable to do so in this license transfer decision 
 
 104 Spanish Radio Network, 10 F.C.C.R. 9954, ¶ 7, 9955 (1995). 
 105 Heftel was a pre-cursor entity of Univision’s merger target, Hispanic Broadcasting 
Corporation.  See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 106 Spanish Radio Network, 10 F.C.C.R. 9954, ¶ 2, 9954 (1995). 
 107 Id. ¶ 4, at 9955. 
 108 Id. ¶ 5, at 9955. 
 109 Id. ¶ 8, at 9956. 
 110 Id. 
 111 “Arbitron Inc. . . . is an international media and marketing research firm serving 
radio broadcasters, cable companies, advertisers, advertising agencies and outdoor 
advertising companies. . . . Arbitron’s core businesses are measuring network and local 
market radio audiences across the United States.” Arbitron, About Arbitron, at 
http://www.arbitron.com/home/content.stm (last viewed Oct. 9, 2004). 
 112 Spanish Radio Network, 10 F.C.C.R. 9954, ¶ 8, 9956 (1995).  Nielsen, which 
calculates television audience share (market), takes into consideration language for 
Hispanic-American ratings.  Nielsen Media Research, Hispanic-American Television 
Audience, at http://www.nielsenmedia.com/ethnicmeasure/hispanic-american/indexHisp-
.html (last viewed Oct. 9, 2004) (“Language usage in these homes has an important 
impact on TV viewing choices.”). 
 113 Spanish Radio Network, 10 F.C.C.R. 9954, ¶ 9, 9956 (1995). 
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because the FCC  required a rulemaking to change existing 
broadcast ownership regulations.114 
The FCC found that language significantly affected market 
advertising and competition, (critical components of the broadcast 
ownership review), even if it did not go so far as to directly include 
language in the market definition of the NBC/Telemundo 
merger.115  Had the merger been approved outright, NBC would 
have owned three stations in the Los Angeles market in violation 
of the television duopoly rule,116 which only permitted a company 
to own two stations in the same market if the market was 
sufficiently diverse.117  NBC requested a twelve month window so 
it could divest itself of one of its Los Angeles stations and comply 
with the rule.118  It argued that temporary ownership of three 
stations in Los Angeles was not a threat to competition and 
diversity in that market since “the NBC and Telemundo stations 
serve distinct audiences and do not compete directly for 
advertising dollars.”119  A comparable situation arose several years 
before in the Los Angeles market when Disney merged with 
ABC.120  In that case, the FCC required divestiture of the offending 
station within six months because Disney would have controlled 
25% of the market’s total advertising revenue.121 
However, the Commission conceded that NBC needed twice as 
much time to divest the television station as ABC did in the same 
exact market, due to the Spanish-language character of the 
television stations at issue.  First, Telemundo’s Spanish-language 
stations generated significantly less advertising money than the 
 
 114 Id. ¶ 9; see also 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law  § 137 (2004) (distinguishing 
between administrative agency actions of adjudication and rulemaking). 
 115 Telemundo Commun. Group, Inc., 17 F.C.C.R. 6958 (2002). 
 116 Id. ¶ 1, at 6960–61. 
 117 Id. ¶ 1, at 6961 n.1 (citing to 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) which read: “The television 
duopoly rule provides that a single entity may own two stations in the same television 
market (Nielsen DMA) if, following the acquisition, there would remain at least eight 
independently owned and operated television stations and at least one of the stations is 
not ranked in the top 4 in the market based upon the most recent all-day audience 
share.”). 
 118 Id. ¶ 1, at 6960–61. 
 119 Id. ¶ 42, at 6974. 
 120 Id. ¶ 52, at 6978. 
 121 Id. 
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Disney stations122 and would have been harder to sell in a six 
month period.123  Second, the Commission found that the Spanish-
language stations “d[id] not compete directly with” the NBC 
English-language station since the three stations at issue, each had 
“distinct programming and a different audience.”124  Therefore 
common ownership was less onerous than the ABC/Disney 
situation.125  The FCC allowed NBC the extra time to comply 
based on the “Spanish-language character of the station” and its 
economic conditions.126  Without resorting to a public rulemaking, 
as had been suggested in Spanish Radio Network, the FCC used 
language to assess competition and advertising when it approved 
the Telemundo/NBC merger. 
4. Network Representation Rule 
Despite the FCC’s avoidance of language as a market 
definition for broadcast ownership decisions, it has vigorously and 
exclusively protected Spanish-language broadcasters by granting 
them permanent waivers to the network representation rule which 
governs the advertising relationship between national broadcast 
networks and their local affiliates.127  By doing so the FCC has 
acknowledged that Spanish-language media faces different 
marketplace challenges and conditions than English-language 
media. 
The network representation rule was created in the 1950s128 
and prohibits affiliates “from being represented by their network in 
the non-network (spot) advertising sales market.”129  Spot 
advertising refers to the time slots “purchased on a market-to-
 
 122 Id. ¶ 52, at 6978–79. 
 123 Id. ¶ 51, at 6978. 
 124 Id. ¶ 48, at 6977.  The two Telemundo stations had different sets of Spanish-language 
programming and the NBC station operated in English. Id. 
 125 Id. ¶ 52, at 6978–79. 
 126 Id. ¶ 52, at 6979. 
 127 See infra text accompanying notes 128–56. 
 128 Network Representation of TV Stations in National Spot Sales; Request of Spanish 
National Network, NPRM, 47 C.F.R. Part 73, 45895, ¶ 6, 45896–97 (Oct. 4, 1978). 
 129 S’holders of Hispanic Broad. Corp., 2003 FCC LEXIS 5106, ¶ 50, *59 n.98 
[hereinafter Univision License Transfer]. 
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market basis rather than through a network.”130  Spot advertising is 
an area the FCC wanted to leave in the control of the affiliates—
and the independent advertising reps they hired—because the FCC 
believed that “network involvement in national spot representation 
of affiliates ‘involves interference with the licensee’s independent 
duty to operate his station in the public interest.’”131  This is 
because affiliates would not be able to maintain their independence 
if the networks controlled the advertising firms who were setting 
the advertising rates in the spot sales market.132  The FCC did not 
want networks to own the advertising representation firms (“rep 
firms”) that could potentially favor the networks in rate setting 
decisions by the stations.133  In 1978, Spanish International 
Network (“SIN”)134 sought a waiver from the network 
representation rule,135 arguing that competition concerns behind 
the rule did not apply in the Spanish-language market.136  The rule 
was supposed to maintain competition between national rep firms.  
However, unlike the English-language market where there were 
many national rep firms to sell non-network advertising, there was 
only one other rep firm selling Spanish-language advertising.137  
SIN argued that it if were subject to the rule, it would not be able 
to afford to create separate national spot and network sales 
advertising organizations.138 
The FCC, however, was concerned that SIN’s relationship with 
its affiliates would be just as detrimental as any other major 
network acting as the rep firm for its affiliates.139  The FCC 
 
 130 University of Texas, Department of Advertising, Quick Index (defining “spot 
television” (or “spot radio”)), at http://advertising.utexas.edu/research/terms/#S (last 
viewed Oct. 27 2004). 
 131 Network Representation of TV Stations in National Spot Sales, supra note 128, ¶7, at 
45897. 
 132 Id ¶ 7, at 45897. 
 133 Id. 
 134 SIN is the predecessor entity to Univision.  Univision, Company Overview: History, 
at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/history.jsp (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). 
 135 Network Representation of TV Stations in National Spot Sales, supra note 128, ¶ 1, 
at 45896. 
 136 Id. ¶ 8, at 45897. 
 137 Id. ¶ 10, at 45897. 
 138 Id. ¶ 8, at 45897. 
 139 Id. ¶ 11, at 45897. 
SERRATORE 1/25/2005  6:15 PM 
2004] SPANISH-LANGUAGE MEDIA REGULATION 225 
recognized that SIN had a “high degree of control” over the 
stations it served and “to the extent the Spanish-speaking 
population forms a distinct audience or ‘market,’” granting a 
waiver in this area [might] increase that “concentration of 
control.”140  In the end, the FCC considered the economic 
consequences at the time.  SIN’s total spot revenue for its twelve 
stations was $9.6 million, compared to the $2.6 billion in revenue 
produced by the “Big Three” (NBC, ABC, and CBS).141  The 
national networks enjoyed greater economic success than 
“‘fledgling’ entities” such as SIN and its affiliates,142 so the FCC 
granted a temporary waiver of the network representation rule, 
thereby allowing SIN to be the only television broadcaster to make 
national spot advertising sales for its own affiliates.143  The FCC 
issued a rulemaking and allowed SIN to serve as national 
advertising representative to its affiliates until Oct. 1, 1979, or 60 
days after the final decision, whichever was later.144  This waiver 
was not reviewed until 1990 and SIN had the un-checked benefit 
of the waiver for 11 years. 
Although the Commission still had not resolved the matter in 
1984, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reviewed the six-year-
old waiver during a hearing on alien control of several Spanish-
language stations.145  SIN had argued that the waiver was 
necessary because SIN’s programming hours would be limited and 
sales would be at most $10 million a year.146  But the judge noted 
that in the six years that SIN benefited from the exclusive waiver, 
it acquired 300 cable and broadcast affiliates, operated twenty-four 
hours a day, and controlled “approximately $98 million of the $118 
million dollars spent in 1984 on Spanish television advertising.”147  
The ALJ questioned whether the waiver prevented competing spot 
 
 140 Id. ¶ 12, at 45898. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id.¶ 17, at 45898. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Spanish Int’l Communications Corp., 1986 FCC LEXIS 4175, ¶ 1, at *2 (1986) 
[hereinafter Seven Hills ALJ Decision]. 
 146 Id. ¶ 186, at *114. 
 147 Id. ¶ 186, at **114–15. 
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sales representatives from entering the market,148 and whether 
lifting the waiver would potentially increase competition and 
relieve broadcasters from having to deal exclusively with SIN.149  
The ALJ concluded that the extension of the waiver to SIN was not 
in the public interest.150 
However, the Commission did not consider the matter until it 
issued a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 1988, to 
reopen the inquiry into the necessity of the waiver.151  The 
temporary waiver of the network representation rule was extended 
until 1990,152 when the FCC concluded that a permanent waiver 
should be issued to SIN/Univision.153  The permanent waiver was 
granted to all Spanish-language networks entering the market 
including Telemundo (1990),154 and Azteca America (2003).155  
The FCC stated that it was in the public interest to “encourage[e] 
the growth and development of new networks; foste[r] foreign-
language programming; increase[e] programming diversity; 
strengthe[n] competition among stations; and foste[r] a competitive 
UHF service.”156  Despite evidence of SIN’s increased 
concentration of control over its affiliates and the potential harm it 
would engender, the FCC extended the waiver of the rule 
permanently to all Spanish-language broadcasters entering the 
market on the theory that the marketplace conditions are unique 
and distinct for Spanish-language media, thus demonstrating the 
 
 148 Id. ¶ 187, at *117. 
 149 Id. ¶ 190, at *118. 
 150 Id. ¶ 191, at *119. 
 151 Amend. of § 73.658(i) of the Comm’n’s Rules, Concerning Network Rep. of TV 
Stations in Nat’l Spot Sales; Request of Spanish Int’l Network (SIN) for Waiver of § 
73.658(i), 3 F.C.C.R. 2746 , ¶¶ 1–2, 2746 (May 12, 1988). 
 152 Id. ¶ 2, at 2746. 
 153 Amend. of § 73.658(i) of the Comm’n’s Rules, Concerning Network Rep. of TV 
Stations in Nat’l Spot Sales; Request of Spanish Int’l Network (SIN) for Waiver of § 
73.658(i), Request of Telemundo Group, Inc. for Waiver of § 73.658(i); Request of Latin 
Int’l Network Corp. for Waiver of § 73.658(i), 5 F.C.C.R. 7280, ¶ 1, 7280 (Dec. 3, 1990).  
SIN had changed its name in the interim years to Univision. Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Azteca Int’l Corp.; Petition for Waiver of § 73.658(i) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 18 
F.C.C.R. 10662, ¶ 5, 10663 (May 23, 2003). 
 156 Id. ¶ 3, at 10663 (quoting Report and Order for permanent waivers for Univision and 
Telemundo). 
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FCC’s readiness to use language as determinative factor of 
competition inquiries. 
5. Cable Television 
Although the FCC has rejected language as a factor in 
broadcast television and radio, the Commission has regulated 
Spanish-language cable television carriage based on language to 
promote programming diversity,157 thus demonstrating a concern 
for foreign-language media in those limited circumstances.  When 
the FCC began adopting rules to govern cable carriage in the early 
1970s, foreign-language stations were treated differently.158 They 
were defined by the FCC as specialty stations,159 those not of 
“general interest to the average viewer.”160  Specifically, the 
Commission noted that “a program broadcast in a foreign language 
is of little interest to any but those fluent in the language.”161  The 
FCC determined that specialty channels would be protected in their 
local markets because local cable operators were required to carry 
local channels162 (“must carry” rules).163  Specialty stations would 
also get the benefit of a Commission waiver so that distant cable 
 
 157 Spanish-language cable channels benefit from unique cable rules defined by 
language.  This note focuses on encouraging Spanish-language media regulation for 
broadcast television under a market definition based on language which has not been 
explicitly used before despite its prevalent use in cable. See generally Part I.B.5. 
 158 Letter from Philip L. Verveer et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch, Aug. 
6, 2003, at 8 (citing Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of the Comm’n’s Rules & 
Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna Television Sys., et seq., Cable Television Report 
and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, ¶ 96, at 180–81 (Feb. 2, 1972)). 
 159 Amend. of Part 76, Subparts A & D of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative 
to Adding a New Definition for “Specialty Stations” & “Specialty Format Programming” 
& Amending the Appropriate Signal Carriage Rules, 58 F.C.C.2d 442, ¶ 2, 442 (Feb. 26, 
1976) (Educational stations were included in this definition as well.). 
 160 Id. ¶ 24, at 452.  The FCC found that the average viewer would not approach news, 
films or sporting events in Spanish and English equally. Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Amend. of Part 76, Subparts A & D of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative 
to Adding a New Definition for “Specialty Stations” & “Specialty Format Programming” 
& Amending the Appropriate Signal Carriage Rules, 58 F.C.C.2d 442, ¶ 36, 457 (Feb. 
26, 1976). 
 163 A commercial broadcast station is allowed to “assert mandatory carriage rights on 
cable systems located within the station’s [DMA].” CoxCom, Inc., 17 F.C.C.R. 17192, ¶ 
2 (Sept. 16, 2002) (citing the must carry order); see also, FCC, About Us, 
http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (Consumer Guide Glossary) (last viewed Nov. 3, 2004). 
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systems could pick up their carriage.164  The Commission 
demonstrated a readiness to tailor regulation based on language in 
cable carriage. 
C. Spanish-Language Media Marketplace 
Despite a long history of foreign-language media in America, 
traditional outlets for Spanish-language media were “old-line 
community newspapers, low-wattage AM radio stations and one 
struggling television network.”165  Today the Spanish-language 
media industry is one of the country’s fastest growing media 
segments, with advertising and revenues increasing 
exponentially.166  As the Spanish speaking population grows,167 
Spanish-language media will increase in importance and 
influence.168  Part I.C will define the landscape of the Spanish-
language media market, outlining the leading companies in radio 
and television and describing the statistical studies that illustrate 
the ways in which the Spanish-language audience use Spanish-
language media. 
1. Radio 
The dominant companies in Spanish-language radio are 
Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation (now Univision Radio), 
Entravision, and Spanish Broadcasting System.  HBC was created 
with the 1997 merger of Heftel Broadcasting Corp. and Tichenor 
Media Systems.169  Heftel was renamed Hispanic Broadcasting in 
 
 164 Amend. of Part 76, Subparts A & D of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative 
to Adding a New Definition for “Specialty Stations” & “Specialty Format Programming” 
& Amending the Appropriate Signal Carriage Rules, 58 F.C.C.2d 442, ¶ 2, 442 (Feb. 26, 
1976). 
 165 Frank Ahearns & Krissah Williams, Spanish-Language Media Expand: 
Broadcasters, Newspaper Pursue Fast-Growing Market, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2003, at 
A1. 
 166 See id. (noting Spanish-language broadcasting is a fast growing market). 
 167 See El Nasser, supra note 1, at A1. 
 168 David Hinckley, Spanish Media Trend Extends to Infinity, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 6, 
2004, at 140 (“This is a very important market for everyone in media.”). 
 169 HBC Overview: Timeline, at http://www.hispanicbroadcasting.com/overview-
_timeline.htm (last viewed Oct. 9, 2004). 
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1999.170  HBC was referred to as the “largest Spanish language 
radio broadcasting company in the United States”171 and before 
HBC merged with Univision in 2003, HBC owned sixty-six radio 
stations in fifteen of the top twenty Hispanic markets.172  It 
controlled “51 percent of Spanish-language radio revenue in the 
top 10 markets in 2002.”173 
Entravision, founded in 1996, maintains holdings in radio, 
television and outdoor advertising.174  Entravision television 
stations “represent the largest television affiliate group of the top-
ranked Univision network.”175  With fifty-six radio stations in the 
top fifty Hispanic markets, Entravision is “one of the nation’s 
largest Spanish-language radio broadcasters.”176  Entravision’s 
radio division was HBC’s greatest competitor.177 
Spanish Broadcasting System (“SBS”) is the “largest Hispanic-
controlled radio broadcasting company in the [U.S.].”178  Founded 
in 1983, SBS operates “27 stations in seven of the top-ten U.S. 
Hispanic market.”179  Viacom has taken a 15% stake in SBS 
subject to the FCC’s approval.180 
 
 170 Id.  HBC’s largest shareholder was Clear Channel Communications. Meg James & 
Jeff Leeds, Regulators Face a Bilingual Conundrum; A Proposed Merger Poses a 
Question: Are Spanish-Language Media Their Own Market?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, 
§ 1, at 1. 
 171 Investor Relations: Company Overview, at http://www.hispanicbroadcasting.com-
/investor_overview.asp (last viewed Oct. 9, 2004). 
 172 Jordan Levin, Univision Sparks Heated Debate in Two Languages, MIAMI HERALD, 
Jun. 22, 2003, http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/6137596.htm?lc (last visited Oct. 
9, 2004). 
 173 Id. (according to “BIA,” a firm specializing in media financial-analysis). 
 174 Entravision, Overview, at http://www.entravision.com/template.cfm?page=about-
&subpage-=overview (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 See infra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 178 Corporate History, at http://www.spanishbroadcasting.com/corporatehistory.shtml 
(last viewed Oct. 10, 2004).  Raúl Alarcón, Jr. is the Chairman and CEO of SBS. Id.  The 
Alarcón family has been involved in Spanish-language broadcasting since the 1950’s. Id. 
 179 About Us, at http://www.spanishbroadcasting.com/aboutus.shtml (last viewed Oct. 
10, 2004). 
 180 Press Release, Viacom Inc., Viacom and Spanish Broadcasting System Announce 
Strategic Alliance (Oct. 5, 2004), http://www.viacom.com/press.tin?ixPressRelease-
=80454180 (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004). 
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2. Television 
The leading sources for Spanish-language broadcast television 
are Univision and Telemundo.  These companies are fiercely 
competitive with each other181 and yet claim that they also compete 
with mainstream English-language broadcasters.182 
a) Leading Companies 
Univision Communications Inc. (“Univision”) started out as 
SIN in 1961.183  Before the merger with HBC, Univision owned 
two television networks,184 a cable network, three record labels and 
a popular Internet website.185  Through the merger, Univision grew 
to sixty-eight radio stations.186  Newspapers commonly call 
Univision the “king of Spanish-language TV.”187  Univision itself 
says it’s the “premier Spanish-language media company in the 
United States.”188  Univision Network is “not only the largest 
Spanish-language network in the U.S., but also the fifth largest 
network overall.”189  “More Hispanics watch the Univision 
 
 181 See Eduardo Porter, Univision Keeps a Short Leach on Its Stars, WALL ST. J., (July 
25, 2003) at B1 (noting the ban Univision has on allowing its stars to appear on 
Telemundo in any capacity). 
 182 Jube Shiver, FCC OK Seen for Univision Bid for Rival, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2003, at 
C1 (remarking that Univision has suggested it “must grow to compete effectively against 
English-language media conglomerates.”). 
 183 Ahearns & Williams, supra note 165, at A1.  SIN was created to act as a sales 
representative for a Los Angeles TV station and several Mexican border stations.  Seven 
Hills ALJ Decision, supra note 145, ¶ 27, at *17.  Originally Televisa, “the largest 
producer and exporter of Spanish-language programming in the world,” had a 75-percent 
ownership stake in SIN. Id. ¶¶ 32–33, at *19–20.  “Univision” started out as a “sales 
concept” which included a package of live Televisa programming that SIN and Televisa 
offered to other licensees. Id. ¶¶ 54–55, at *31–32. 
 184 The two broadcast networks are Univision Network and Telefutura Network 
(launched in 2002).  History, at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/history.jsp (last viewed 
Oct. 10, 2004). 
 185 Business Description, at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/business.jsp (last viewed 
Oct. 10, 2004). 
 186 Id. 
 187 James & Leeds, supra note 170, at A1. 
 188 Press Release, Univision, Univision Completes Merger with Hispanic Broadcasting 
(Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.univision.net/corp/en/pr/Los_Angeles_22092003-2.jsp (last 
viewed Oct. 10, 2004). 
 189 Univision Network, at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/univision.jsp (last viewed 
Oct. 10, 2004). 
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Network in each ratings daypart (primetime, daytime etc. . .) than 
each of ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX and Telemundo.”190  In the 2002–
2003 season, “49 of the top-50 Spanish-language shows. . . aired 
on Univision.”191  It controls 80% of the Spanish-language TV 
audience.192  The Univision Music Group, a subsidiary of 
Univision Communications, controls “about 35% of the Latin 
music market.”193  Univision.com is also the “No. 1 Spanish-
language website for U.S. Hispanics.”194 
In 1987, decades after the advent of Univision, Telemundo 
entered the market,195 and it has never truly rivaled the older 
station in ratings.196  After a bankruptcy and several changes in 
ownership,197 NBC acquired Telemundo in 2002 for $2 billion.198  
Telemundo is now considered “the second-largest Spanish-
language TV network in the U.S.”199  However, Telemundo has 
often placed “a distant second in audience ratings to Univision.”200  
Although Telemundo operates in 118 markets, reaching 91% of 
Hispanic TV households,201 Telemundo has only approximately 
20% of the viewing audience, with the other 80% captured by 
Univision.202  Telemundo has been historically and derogatorily 
 
 190 Id. 
 191 Louis Chunovic, Spanish-Language TV Hits Stride at Upfront Market, TELEVISION 
WEEK, May 26, 2003, at 16.  The one “non-Univision series” was the Super Bowl. Id. 
 192 Shiver, supra note 182, at C1; Navarro, supra note 3, at C8. 
 193 Business Description, at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/business.jsp (last viewed 
Oct. 10, 2004). 
 194 History, at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/history.jsp (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004).  
The website gets “over 1 billion hits a year.” Marcelo Ballve, 
The Battle For Latino Media, NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 20. 
 195 Michael White, Telemundo Spends on Novelas to Woo Viewers; NBC Pushes More 
Original Programming, SUN-SENTINEL (FORT LAUDERDALE, FL), Oct. 26, 2003, at 15F. 
 196 Jordan infra note 203, at B1 (noting “Univision’s dominance has long rendered 
Miami-based Telemundo a weak No 2.”). 
 197 Id. 
 198 James & Leeds, supra note 170, at A1. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Rowley & Lewis, supra note 49, § 3, at 11. 
 201 Corporate Information, at http://www.telemundo.com/telemundo/2449824-
/detail.html (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004).  Univision reaches 98 percent “of all U.S. 
Hispanic television households.” Business Description, at http://www.univision.net-
/corp/en/business.jsp (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004). 
 202 Harry Berkowitz, Spanish-Language Telemundo Bought by NBC, NEWSDAY, Oct. 12, 
2001, at A62. 
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perceived as a “Caribbean network.”203  It has been suggested that 
Telemundo does not connect with Hispanics of Mexican descent, 
the core U.S. Hispanic target audience.204  Its primetime network 
audience share of Hispanic 18–49 year-olds has increased from 
17% to 23% in 2004, but as one analyst put it, it had “nowhere to 
go but up.”205  Univision still has three times as many viewers as 
Telemundo, a wider geographical reach, and a new radio platform 
to cross-promote its programming.206  Even with the power of 
NBC behind Telemundo, Univision continues to dominate the 
television market. 
b) Hispanic Audience Television Viewing Habits 
Recent research shows that Spanish-language audiences have 
different media habits than English-language audiences.  There is a 
demonstrated preference for news and entertainment programming 
in Spanish, even if the viewers are bilingual and cable and internet 
offerings are not as accessible.  Second Audio Program (“SAP”) 
has been an alternative tool in the television arsenal to reach 
Spanish-language audiences.207  SAP allows television stations to 
broadcast in English and at the same time offer a Spanish-language 
simulcast.208  However, there has been some debate over whether 
 
 203 Miriam Jordan, Telemundo Network Takes on Univision with Help from NBC, WALL. 
ST. J., Apr. 15, 2004, at B1 (chronicling the struggles Telemundo has faced in competing 
with Univision and some of the steps NBC is taking to assist Telemundo).  Due to 
Univision’s deal with Televisa, a large investor in Univision and the “world’s largest 
Hispanic broadcaster,” Univision has a lock on “a steady supply of Mexican telenovelas 
[(soap operas)] and unbeatable prime-time ratings.” Id.  Telemundo had sourced 
programming from Columbia and Brazil but that type of programming did not catch on 
with “viewers of Mexican descent.” Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Jordan, supra note 203, at B2. 
 207 “In 1985, the FCC allowed television stations to begin broadcasting stereo audio.  
Not only did we get Stereo, but we also got an additional channel where we can broadcast 
another audio program.  This channel is called SAP for Second Audio Program.” 
Milwaukee Public Television, SAP, http://mptv.org/mptvhome/tech/sap.html (last viewed 
Nov. 4, 2004). 
 208 E.g., Jodi Bizar, Language Barrier; Simulcasts in Spanish of News Programs a 
Debatable Strategy for Television Stations, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 15, 2002, 
at 1B.  SAP is available on all stereo-equipped TVs. Id. 
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offering SAP simulcasts are worthwhile.209  For instance, ABC 
launched a Spanish simulcast of World News Tonight with Peter 
Jennings in 2000.210  Yet after one year the simulcast was 
discontinued because it was not worth the annual $1 million cost to 
maintain the service, as it did not make an appreciable difference 
on Hispanic viewership.211 Since localism and diversity are 
measured by local news programming,212 there is great concern 
about whether SAP broadcasts of the local news advance the 
public interest.  Some parties have criticized the simulcasts as not 
being a fair substitute for local news in Spanish.213  A recent study 
by the Tomas Rivera Institute found that “Hispanics tend to prefer 
news on Spanish stations, which offer more local and international 
Latino news plus a smoother style.”214  Local news stations in large 
Hispanic markets have stated, “English-language stations and the 
Spanish-language stations appeal to different audiences.”215  News 
stories translated into Spanish are still directed at Anglos and not 
Latinos.216  In a study comparing Spanish-language local news 
with English-language local news, it was found that they were 
equal in quality (both were given Cs on average),217 but the subject 
matter of coverage differed greatly.218 
 
 209 See id.; John M. Higgins, Spanish on SAP Just Hasn’t Caught on, BROADCASTING & 
CABLE, Mar. 24, 2003, at 24. 
 210 Sandra Hernandez, ABC Rocks en Espanol, L.A. WEEKLY, Oct. 13–19, 2000, 
http://www.laweekly.com/ink/00/47/offbeat.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 211 Bizar, supra note 208, at 1B; Higgins, supra note 209, at 24.  Local broadcaster 
WRAL in Raleigh, N.C. launched simultaneous translation of its local news and after two 
years ended the program due to cost and lack of feedback. Higgins, supra note 209, at 24. 
 212 Biennial Review 2002, supra note 22, ¶ 78, at 13644. 
 213 Tatiana Pina, Channel 6 Offering Local News in Spanish, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 26, 
2001, at B03.  One broadcast personality said, “It’s a nice effort but the Latino 
community is really interested in hearing local news from their perspective.  They like 
local news and international news from their countries of origin.” Id. 
 214 Higgins, supra note 209, at 24. 
 215 Daisy Whitney, L.A. Stations Evolve to Serve Population Shifts, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, 
July 24, 2000, at 13. 
 216 Higgins, supra note 209, at 24. 
 217 Quality was judged by topic range, focus, enterprise of stories, expertise, number of 
sources, viewpoints and local relevance. Lauren Alexandre & Henrik Rehbinder, 
Separate but Equal, Comparing Local News in English and Spanish, Special report: 
Local TV News, On the Road to Irrelevance, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV./PROJECT FOR 
EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, (Nov./Dec. 2002), at 99, available at 
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A recent study showed that SAP has not been considered a 
significant substitute for Spanish-language programming, since 
only 42% of Hispanic households are cognizant of its existence 
and only one in six study respondents used it with any 
frequency.219  Univision itself has challenged the notion that 
English-language SAP simulcasts are a worthy substitute for 
Spanish-language programming, stating that cultural preferences 
for Spanish-language programming are the reason behind 
Univision’s dominance in the Hispanic ratings.220  Top-rated 
English-language shows such as Friends and CSI rank 189 and 
334, respectively, for Hispanic viewers.221  Even academics have 
noted that “viewing patterns for Latinos(as) are . . . different from 
those of whites.”222  Among bilingual Latinos, the choice of which 
language they watch on television often depends on the format.223  
 
http://www.journalism.org/resources/research/reports/localtv/2002/spanish.asp (last 
viewed Oct. 10, 2004). 
 218 Id.  Thirty-four percent of the Spanish-language broadcasts portrayed police officers 
as the likely antagonists, whereas twenty-six percent of English-language broadcasts 
included crime stories. Id. at 100.  Immigration stories were common in Spanish-
language news, but practically non-existent in English-language news (less than half of 
one percent of all stories). Id.  Foreign affairs coverage in English-language news focused 
on U.S. foreign policy whereas the focus of Spanish-language news was on Latin 
America. Id. 
 219 Press Release, Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, Channel Surfing in English and 
Spanish: New Study Reveals the Viewing Habits of the 16 Million Latino Adults Who 
Watch TV Bilingually, May 21, 2003, at http://trpi.org/pages/nr03.html (noting study 
Louis DeSipio, Latino Viewing Choices: Bilingual Television Viewers and the Language 
Choices They Make, Tomas Rivera Policy Institute). 
 220 Chunovic, supra note 191, at 16. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of Color by 
the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 
293, 317 (2003).  Unique content offered only on Spanish-language channels also could 
drive viewers in the other direction.  English-speaking audiences may begin to tune into 
Spanish-language programs since Telemundo has begun to make its sexy telenovelas 
(soap operas) available with English subtitles through closed captioning. Telenovelas 
Translated, N.Y. POST, Apr. 22, 2004, at 91.  World Cup soccer matches have often 
driven English-language viewers to watch Spanish-language networks when they cannot 
get the games anywhere else. James Ewinger, World Comes to Irish Haunt for Soccer 
Cup, PLAIN DEALER (CLEV.), July 1, 2002, at B1 (noting that Brazilians watched the 
World Cup on a Spanish channel at an Irish bar). 
 223 Press Release, Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, Channel Surfing in English and 
Spanish: New Study Reveals the Viewing Habits of the 16 Million Latino Adults Who 
Watch TV Bilingually, May 21, 2003, at http://trpi.org/pages/nr03.html. 
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Most bilingual Latinos preferred news, soap operas, and variety 
programming in Spanish.224  It is also important to note that 
“[r]ecent studies have shown that U.S.-born Latinos tend to retain 
the culture of their heritage more than other immigrant groups.”225  
Even if they speak English well, 60% “of Hispanics prefer to 
[speak] Spanish.”226  These statistics show that Spanish-language 
audiences prefer their programming in Spanish—not just translated 
into Spanish, but actually targeted for a Spanish-speaking 
audience. 
Despite the growth of Spanish-language offerings on cable, 
cable has been viewed as an insufficient substitute for free 
television,227 especially as a source for local programming.228  
Local news has been the FCC’s indicator for localism and 
viewpoint diversity in a local market229 and the FCC’s own studies 
have shown that “local cable channels are the least watched of any 
broadcast or cable stations.”230  Local cable channels operate in 
limited markets.  Local cable channels only reach 10–15% of cable 
systems nationwide and of the twenty-two local cable news 
channels available, five serve the New York City area.231  This 
problem is exacerbated by cable’s reach to Hispanic households.  
Cable penetration rates for Hispanic households are much lower 
than in other American households,232 so even with a growing 
number of Spanish-language programming choices available on 
cable, access remains a problem.233  Nielsen has found that “[o]ut 
 
 224 Id. 
 225 Miriam Jordan, Hispanic Magazines Gain Ad Dollars, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 3, 2004, at 
B2. 
 226 Id. It is important to recognize that as the Hispanic population grows and more media 
outlets try to capture that audience, the methods used by different media outlets to 
accomplish this task will become increasingly varied.  Today, some magazines targeted at 
Hispanics in America are offered in Spanish, some are in English, and some mix English 
and Spanish for groups who live in both worlds. Id.  Magazine publishers agree that 
“[s]imply translating English articles into Spanish doesn’t work.” Id. 
 227 Baynes, supra note 222, at 326–27. 
 228 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 405 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Baynes, supra note 222, at 330; Allison Romano, Checking the Census, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 1, 2001, at 32. 
 233 Baynes, supra note 222, at 330. 
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of 10.2 million total Hispanic TV homes, only 6.4 million receive 
cable or satellite service.”234  With such a small percentage of 
Hispanic homes receiving cable, and with little local programming 
on cable, cable cannot be a sufficient substitute for the local news 
service provided by broadcast television and radio. 
Just as cable access lags behind in Hispanic homes, so does 
internet access.  The FCC has “acknowledged that almost 30% of 
Americans do not have Internet access.”235  Internet access for 
Hispanic households is behind that of non-Hispanic households 
and “only about 3 percent of all content on the Web is in 
Spanish.”236  The FCC’s own studies have demonstrated that the 
Internet is not a significant source for local news programming,237 
and like cable, is a weak substitute for broadcast television and 
radio when considering localism and diversity concerns.  These 
statistics show that even if cable and the internet become viable 
alternative sources to local broadcasting and newspapers (which 
the Third Circuit court did not find was the case),238 they may, 
nonetheless, be inaccessible to, or infrequently used by Spanish-
language audiences at the same rate and in the same way. 
It was in this media environment that the merger of Univision 
and Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation was reviewed and 
approved.  Part II will lay out the issues that shaped the Univision 
debate from the market definitions used by the DOJ and the FCC, 
to the public comments and concerns that were raised when the 
merger was proposed.  Part III will show that the FCC’s decision to 
approve the Univision merger was bad for localism, competition 
and diversity.  The FCC’s failure to define the market by language 
was abandonment of its precedent and not in the public interest. 
 
 234 Romano, supra note 232, at 32.  Digital cable penetration rates are also lower in the 
Hispanic market. Id. 
 235 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 407 (3d. Cir. 2004). 
 236 Cara DiPasquale & Kris Karnopp, More Web Retailers Cater to Hispanics, CHI. 
TRIB., June 12, 2003, at 35. 
 237 Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 406. 
 238 Id. at 405–08. 
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II. THE UNIVISION DEBATE 
As the history of federal regulation of foreign-language media 
demonstrates,239 the FCC has encouraged the dissemination of 
foreign-language media to American audiences and has designed 
regulation to protect and further its distribution.  The arguments 
raised in the merger have shaped the debate over foreign-language 
media regulation for the future.  Part II.A will explain the methods 
and results of the DOJ antitrust review of the merger.  Part II.B 
will illustrate the public comments the FCC received which argued 
for and against the Univision merger.  Part II.C will describe the 
FCC’s rationale in granting the license transfer in the Univision 
merger.  Part III will however demonstrate that the FCC failed in 
granting the merger and its reasoning lacks credibility and support. 
A. The Department of Justice Review of the Merger of Univision 
and HBC 
In 2002, Univision Communications sought to merge with 
Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation240 through a $3 billion241 radio 
license transfer application to the FCC.242  Due to the high costs 
involved and media entities involved, the merger was subject to 
review by the DOJ and FCC.243 
The DOJ approved the merger under a conditional consent 
decree.244  The DOJ claimed that the contemplated merger would 
have violated antitrust law unless certain conditions were put into 
 
 239 See supra Part I. 
 240 Hispanic Broad. Corp., 17 F.C.C.R. 23717 (Nov. 22, 2002) (adopting Protective 
Order). 
 241 Jeff Leeds, Clear Channel is Expanding in Spanish Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
2004, at C1. 
 242 Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 1, at *1. 
 243 United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 1:03-CV-00758 (Mar. 26, 
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200800/200878.htm (Complaint for 
Injunctive Relief; citing the Clayton Act for the authority of the DOJ to review the 
merger) (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 244 United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 1:03-CV-00758 (Dec. 22, 
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f202100/202184.htm (Final Judgment 
Civil Action, hereinafter “DOJ Final Judgment”) (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
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place.245  To determine if a merger is compatible with antitrust law, 
the agency will first define a product market, here, it was Spanish-
language radio advertising246 and a geographic market, here, the 
overlap markets of “Dallas, El Paso, Las Vegas, McAllen-
Brownsville-Harlingen, Phoenix and San Jose,”247 to determine if 
the merger will increase concentration in those defined markets.248  
The DOJ viewed this transaction as a merger of radio assets with 
no impact on television, so it did not perform any analysis of the 
pertinent television market.  In its analysis of radio, the DOJ found 
that the merger would “lessen competition”249 in the sale of 
Spanish-language radio advertising and also increased prices in the 
same market.250  The DOJ found the merger to be in violation of § 
7 of the Clayton Act251 one of the principal antitrust statutes.252 
To determine if there was market concentration in Spanish-
language radio, the DOJ focused on Univision’s “significant and 
long-standing relationship”253 with Entravision and Univision’s 
potential control of Entravision radio assets.254  At the time of the 
proposed merger, Univision had corporate governance rights, 30% 
equity and a 7% voting stake in Entravision.255  If the merger were 
 
 245 United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 03-CV-0758 at 1–2 (May 7, 
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201006.htm (Competitive 
Impact Statement) (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 246 Id. at 5.  The DOJ found that advertisers did not consider Spanish-language radio to 
be a “reasonable substitute” for non-Spanish-language radio or any other media. Id. 
 247 Id. at 6. 
 248 Cavanagh, supra note 53, at 72 (demonstrating the DOJ application of the 1992 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines to radio mergers). 
 249 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12–27 (2004). 
 250 United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 1:03-CV-00758 (Mar. 26, 
2003), (Complaint for Injunctive Relief) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr-
/cases/f200800/200878.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 251 United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 03-CV-0758 (May 7, 2003), 
(“Competitive Impact Statement”) [hereinafter “Univision Competitive Impact 
Statement”]  available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201006.htm (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 252 PITOFSKY supra note 51, at App. [1]. 
 253 Univision Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 251. 
 254 United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 03-CV-0758 at 3 (May 7, 
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201006.htm (Competitive 
Impact Statement) (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).  The broadcast affiliation agreement with 
Univision lasts until 2021. Id. 
 255 Id. 
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consummated without conditional divestiture, competition would 
be reduced between HBC and Entravision.256  HBC and 
Entravision were vigorous competitors in the Spanish-language 
radio market for advertisers.257  There were few other competitors, 
so the market was highly concentrated, with HBC and 
Entravision’s “combined share of advertising revenue ranging from 
70 to 95 percent” of the market in this merger.258  Univision’s 
control and influence over both companies could therefore lessen 
competition, increase prices, and reduce quality of service.259  
Univision would not have the incentive to compete against 
Entravision after the merger since Univision “will benefit even if a 
customer chooses Entravision rather than HBC.”260  With no other 
significant competitors in the market, advertising buyers would 
have no choice but to ostensibly deal with Univision either through 
HBC or Entravision.261 
Since DOJ decisions are not subject to the public debate and 
scrutiny of FCC decisions, the DOJ acted alone in proposing 
conditions to lessen Univision’s ability to control Entravision and 
preserve competition in Spanish-language radio advertising.262  
Univision had to exchange all the common stock it held in 
Entravision for a non-voting equity interest,263 so that Univision 
would have neither voting nor director rights in Entravision.264  
The Justice Department gave Univision three years to divest its 
interest in Entravision.265  The goal was to ensure, initially,  that 
Univision had no more than 15% of “all outstanding shares of 
Entravision,” and after six years, that Univision would own “no 
more than ten percent of all outstanding shares on a fully converted 
basis.”266  Univision would be subject to these divestiture 
 
 256 Id. at 4. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. at 7. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. at 8. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. at 9; see generally DOJ Final Judgment, supra note 244. 
 263 DOJ Final Judgment, supra note 244, at 4. 
 264 Id. at 6. 
 265 Id. at 4. 
 266 Id. at 4–5. 
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requirements if it acquired any additional equity in Entravision 
later on.267 
Univision’s role in Entravision’s corporate governance was 
also curtailed.268  Univision could not influence Entravision’s radio 
business whether through its television relationship or by 
communicating or receiving non-public information on 
Entravision’s radio business.269  Despite these precautions, the DOJ 
permitted Entravision to advertise on Univision radio and conduct 
joint promotions with them.270  Univision could in turn advertise 
on Entravision as well.271 
Since the DOJ’s only concern was a lessening of competition, 
once Univision’s relationship with Entravision was limited, the 
merger was granted.  It however still required the public interest 
inquiry of the FCC. 
B. Public Response to the FCC on the Proposed Merger 
The Justice Department approved the merger in May of 
2003.272  From August 2002273 until August 2003, public 
comments were submitted to the Commission on the subject of the 
Univision merger.274  Ultimately, the industry filings to the FCC 
(by mainly Spanish Broadcasting System and Univision) shaped 
both sides of the dispute regarding whether Spanish-language 
media was a separate media market.  Those against the merger 
offered evidence of the use and operation of Spanish-language 
media to demonstrate how it was a separate media market and 
 
 267 Id. at 5. 
 268 See id. at 6–8.  Univision would not be permitted to elect officers, participate in 
Board meetings, or “us[e] or attempt[] to use any ownership interest in Entravision to 
exert any influence over Entravision in the conduct of Entravision’s radio business.” Id. 
at 6–7.  Univision could not prevent Entravision from changing their corporate 
governance documents. Id. at 7. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
 272 See generally supra Part II.A. 
 273 Public Notice, Media Bureau Announces Assignment Of Docket No. To Proceeding 
Involving Applications Filed By Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation And Univision 
Communications, Inc. For Consent To Transfer Of Control Of Licenses And 
Subsidiaries, 2002 FCC LEXIS 4071 (Rel. Aug. 16, 2002). 
 274 See infra Part II.B.1–2 
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should be regulated as such.  Those in favor of the merger argued 
that Spanish-language media was part of the general media market 
and an artificial market designation otherwise would be a separate 
but equal standard. 
1. Pro-Merger 
Proponents of the merger argued that Spanish-language media 
was part of the general media market, and consolidation between 
these two market players would not be problematic because radio 
listeners and TV viewers would still have a wealth of choices.275  
In fact, consolidation between media players might benefit 
audiences by increasing the chances that a merged media entity 
would be able to better compete with traditional English-language 
radio and television networks.276  These arguments were made with 
an understanding that Spanish and English-language media were 
substitutes, and therefore competitors.277  Proponents also focused 
on the benefits that the merged company would generate.278  The 
FCC received numerous letters from members of Congress who 
supported the merger because it would “promote the growth of 
Hispanic media”279 and lead to “the goal of better competition and 
 
 275 Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo, Counsel to Univision & HBC, to 
Chairman Michael Powell, FCC, comment filed by Univision and HBC (May 14, 2003) 
(Proceeding 02-235) (noting that  “[t]here [a]re [n]umerous [s]panish-[l]angauge [m]edia 
[s]ources [a]vailable to Hispanic [a]udiences”), at http://www.fcc.gov/transaction-
/univision-hbc.html (last viewed Oct. 11, 2004). 
 276 See Letter from Congressmen Henry Bonilla & Patrick Toomey to Chairman 
Michael Powell, FCC (June 6, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004); Letter from 
Sen. Orrin Hatch to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (July 10, 2003) (Proceeding 02-
235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004); 
Letter from Rep. Ciro Rodridguez to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (Aug. 12, 2003) 
(Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2004). 
 277 See infra text accompanying note 294. 
 278 Neil Roland, FCC Likely to Approve Hispanic Media Merger, Despite Criticism, 
HOUS. CHRON., June 22, 2003, at 3. 
 279 Letter from Rep. David Dreier to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (June 6, 2003) 
(Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2004). 
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stability.”280  Community groups contended that the merger would 
“promote growth of Hispanic radio and television job[s],” capital 
investments in Hispanic media would increase, and the combined 
resources of Univision and HBC “w[ould] provide enhanced 
services to the Hispanic community.”281 
In its FCC filings, Univision made clear that it opposed an 
arbitrary division of Spanish-language media from the general 
media marketplace—a “separate but equal” standard.282  Univision 
posited that this was a straightforward merger of a “television 
company with a radio company”283 that “complie[d] with all 
Commission rules.”284  Univision argued that there was “no factual 
basis for artificially designating a separate Spanish-language 
regulatory market.”285 Univision contended that competitiveness 
and growth of the Hispanic media sector would not be served by 
regulation that would “artificially retard its growth.”286  Univision 
raised several FCC precedents where the FCC had found no 
separate Spanish-language media market, and Univision reasoned 
these decisions should not be overturned.287 
Univision stated that there were no grounds to suggest 
Hispanic audiences would “lack adequate listening and viewing 
 
 280 Letter from Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchinson to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (June 
25, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2004). 
 281 See, e.g., Letter from Eugenio Carrillo, Jr., President, Stanislaus County Hispanic 
Chamber of Commerce, to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (May 27, 2003) (Proceeding 
02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004); 
Letter from Estela Scarlatta, Co-Founder, Bilingual Foundation of the Arts, to Chairman 
Michael Powell, FCC (received June 27, 2004) (Proceeding 02-235), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).  They 
noted “Univision’s commitment to the Hispanic community” through jobs, scholarships 
and sponsorships of youth groups. Letter from Steven A. Soto, Mexican American 
Grocers Association, to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (received June 5, 2003) 
(Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2004). 
 282 Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo (May 14, 2003), supra note 275. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Letter from Scott. R. Flick, Attorney for Univision, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary 
of the FCC, Response to SBS Ex Parte Filings (July 23, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). 
 287 Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo (May 14, 2003), supra note 275. 
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options after the merger.”288  It contended that the argument 
“Hispanics listen only to Spanish media is a fallacy.”289  Despite its 
oft-cited ratings record,290 Univision offered up statistics showing 
that Hispanics “listen to and watch a broad diversity of broadcast 
sources,” including English-language broadcast television and 
radio, independent Spanish-language television stations, broadcast 
stations available from Mexico, Spanish-language newspapers, and 
Spanish-language Internet offerings.291  Although it had publicly 
argued the opposite292 to the FCC, Univision argued Spanish-
language audiences use the SAP channel for viewing English-
language networks.293  Univision had noted in several press reports 
that it needed HBC to compete with the English-language 
networks.294  Univision argued that this merger would add to the 
diversity of choices in the market and not reduce the number of 
Spanish radio stations available.295  Univision claimed that radio 
station format changes from “English to Spanish [a]re 
[c]ommon,”296 suggesting a functional substitutability between the 
formats, and that the number of Spanish-language radio stations 
was on the rise.297  Moreover, HBC and Univision had committed 
themselves to build more “listening and viewing options” through 
the conversion of new stations to Spanish format and not through 
consolidation of existing stations.298 
Univision opposed those competitors taking a position against 
the merger.  Univision criticized SBS, on procedural grounds, for 
conducting its challenges to the merger through 2000 pages of ex 
 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Chunovic, supra note 191, at 16. 
 291 Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo (May 14, 2003), supra note 275. 
 292 Chunovic, supra note 191, at 16. 
 293 Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo (May 14, 2003), supra note 275. 
 294 FCC Probably Will Approve Univision Purchase, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 
22, 2003) at E-8. 
 295 See infra note 298 and accompanying text. 
 296 Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo (May 14, 2003), supra note 275. 
 297 Id.  HBC’s radio offerings targeted at Hispanic listeners are programmed in Spanish, 
English and they are offered in bilingual formats as well. Id.  Audiences and stations are 
freely moving between both formats. Id. 
 298 Id. 
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parte presentations, instead of filing a petition to deny.299  To file a 
petition to deny, a party must raise “specific allegations of fact 
sufficient to show that . . . a grant of the application would be 
prima facie inconsistent with [the public interest].”300  There is a 
high burden of proof on the petitioning party301 and “[g]eneral or 
conclusory allegations or those based simply on belief are not 
sufficient.”302  However, ex parte presentations “[are] not served 
on the parties to the proceeding, or, if oral, [are] made without 
advance notice to the parties and without opportunity for them to 
be present.”303  Univision also attacked SBS for inconsistencies in 
its filings304 and ignorance of the FCC case law305 in which the 
FCC states that “it will not consider a stations’ programming 
format in processing. . .transfer applications.”306  Univision 
attacked Telemundo for many of the same things, labeling them as 
 
 299 Letter from Scott. R. Flick (July 23, 2003), supra note 286. 
 300 Telemundo Communications Group, 17 F.C.C.R. 6958, ¶ 7, 6962 (2002) (quoting 
Citizens for Jazz on WRVR, Inc. v. FCC, 775 F.2d 392, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing 47 
U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1982)). 
 301 Id. ¶ 7, at 6962 (describing the substantial process to succeed on a petition to deny 
filing).  “Under Section 309(d) of the Communications Act, there is a two-step test for 
determining whether a petition to deny raises issues requiring that a transfer or 
assignment application be designated for hearing.  First, the petition to deny must set 
forth ‘specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that . . . a grant of the application 
would be prima facie inconsistent with [the public interest].’ Second, if the Commission 
concludes, based upon the totality of the evidence, that there is a ‘substantial and material 
question of fact’ concerning whether the grant of the application would serve the public 
interest it must formally designate the application for a hearing in accordance with 
Section 309(e) of the Communications Act.” Id. 
 302 Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 53, at *62. 
 303 FCC, Ex Parte Fact Sheet, “What is an Ex Parte Presentation,” 
http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/admain/ex_parte_factsheet.html (last viewed Nov. 4, 2004).  
Though the FCC promulgates Ex Parte Rules to govern this procedure.  See FCC, FCC’s 
Ex Parte Rules at http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/xprte.html (last viewed Nov. 5, 2004). 
 304 Letter from Scott. R. Flick (July 23, 2003), supra note 286, at 4–5. 
 305 Id. at 8.  Additionally, Univision claimed that SBS’s call for costly “case-by-case 
review” was out of step with the Commission’s recent 2002 biennial review upholding a 
bright-line test. See id. at 9.  The SBS cited case law stating that “the [FCC] has sought to 
encourage the growth of minority-oriented programming, including Spanish-language 
programming, and have nothing to do with treating such programming as part of a 
separate market for multiple ownership purposes.” Id. at 10. 
 306 Id. at 10. 
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another “jilted suitor” of HBC.307  It challenged Telemundo’s 
accusation that the merger would lead to a Univision monopoly of 
viewpoints, asserting that the percentage of Univision’s audience 
share of Hispanic viewing was completely wrong.308  Telemundo 
claimed that Univision’s share was 70% of the Hispanic audience, 
while Univision claimed its share was only 20%.309  It disagreed 
with Telemundo’s claim that its thirteen-year exclusive content 
deal with Televisa310 was not in the public interest311 and suggested 
Telemundo’s failure to beat Univision in the ratings had little to do 
with the Televisa programming, which accounts for only one-third 
of Univision’s line-up.312  Univision, as the television market 
leader, did not consider the claims raised by Telemundo, its oft 
second-place competitor, to accurately reflect the issues raised by 
the merger.  Univision argued it was not a monopoly under the 
FCC broadcast ownership rules and even with these additional 
radio stations, it would still be in compliance with those language-
neutral rules. 
At the same time, Univision sought the continued protection of 
its business from the network representation rule, which is 
applicable only to Spanish-language broadcasters.  Univision 
vociferously protested any effort by the FCC to change the status 
of the permanent waiver to national spot sales as a condition to the 
merger with HBC.313  It threatened that any effort to remove this 
waiver could lead to public harm and “the loss of local Spanish-
language television programming and stations.”314  Furthermore, 
there could be “disruption to investment in Spanish-formatted 
 
 307 Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy L. Russo, Attorneys for Univision & HBC, to 
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary of the FCC (Aug. 27, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). 
 308 Id. 
 309 Id. 
 310 Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico Media Mogul Follows the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 
2004, at W1 (“Univision has exclusive rights to Televisa’s programs until 2017.”). 
 311 Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy L. Russo (Aug. 27, 2003), supra note 307. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Letter from Scott R. Flick, Attorney for Univision, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary 
of the FCC (Sept. 8, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod-
/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). 
 314 Id. 
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television operations.”315  In addition, Entravision, a third party to 
the merger, would likely suffer the “greatest harm from its 
elimination.”316  It could harm affiliates in the smallest markets 
that are less likely to get national spot sales otherwise, and there is 
“no ready substitute for Univision’s national sales representation 
service . . . available to Entravision or other affiliates.”317  Thus, 
Univision said that all of the public interest reasons on which the 
waiver was premised still existed.318  More importantly, the 
elimination of the waiver had “no conceivable connection to the 
HBC merger.”319  Though Univision opposed the argument that 
Spanish-language media was a separate media market, and it did 
not want a separate-but-equal regulation regime to be installed, it 
continued to seek unique protection from the national 
representation rule which had been granted only to Spanish-
language broadcasters.  Its advocacy continued to protect 
Entravision, who operated the most Univision affiliates, since 
Univision’s television interests continued to be intertwined with 
Entravision’s, although the DOJ had curtailed its influence over 
Entravision’s radio holdings. 
2. Anti-Merger 
Many opponents of the merger argued that Spanish-language 
media is a separate media market, and if the FCC permitted 
Univision to merge with HBC, consolidation by the leading TV 
and radio entities would significantly reduce competition within 
the Spanish-language media market.320  If one corporation were to 
dominate all Spanish-language media, questions of programming, 
source, and viewpoint diversity will be at issue.321  Members of the 
public opposed the merger on the grounds that programming 
diversity will be harmed and it would be harder for new entities, 
 
 315 Id. 
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. 
 320 Letter from Sen. Tom Daschle to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (May 6, 2003) 
(Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2004). 
 321 Id. 
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especially Hispanic ones, to enter the market.322  Public interest 
groups and legislators were also concerned that the merger would 
make future entry into the marketplace more difficult.323  Several 
Senators urged the Commission to make a study of the Spanish-
language media market before approving the Univision merger.324  
The Congressional Hispanic Caucus asked the Commission to 
“carefully review the full impact that this merger will have on the 
Hispanic community.”325 
Since review of the Univision merger coincided with the 
biennial review of media ownership rules, concerns over media 
 
 322 A public letter-writing campaign contributed 5,553 letters from Hispanic-Americans 
opposing the merger. See Letter from Arthur Belendiuk, Counsel for NHPI, to Marlene 
H. Dortch, Secretary of the FCC (July 28, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); Letter from 
Arthur Belendiuk, Counsel for NHPI, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary of the FCC (July 
29, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2004) (The letters, in Spanish and English, spoke to the participant’s 
concern that the Univision merger would “limit opportunities for Hispanic-Americans to 
receive diverse news information and cultural programming,” “[would] damage [their] 
culture,” “limit competition” and “make it more difficult for Hispanic-Americas to start 
their own companies” in television and radio.). But see supra note 281 and accompanying 
text (describing letters in favor of the merger). 
 323 See Letter from Sen. Edward Kennedy et al., infra note 324.  The Media Access 
Project (“MAP”), a public interest telecommunications law firm, made ex parte 
presentations to draw the Commission’s attention to the barriers-to-entry problems in the 
Spanish-language media market. Letter from Andrew Jay Schwartzman, President & 
CEO, Media Access Project, to Chairman Michael Powell and Commissioners, FCC 
(July 25, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod-
/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 324 See Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy & Sen. James Jeffords to Chairman Michael 
Powell, FCC (May 20, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod-
/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); Letter from Sen. Hillary Rodham 
Clinton to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (May 7, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); Letter from 
Sen. Edward Kennedy et al. to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (May 15, 2003) 
(Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2004); Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy & Sen. James Jeffords to Chairman 
Michael Powell, FCC (May 20, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); Ballve, 
supra note 194,  at 20 (describing the Capitol Hill political debate that the Univision 
merger generated). 
 325 Letter from Rep. Robert Menendez et al. to Chairman Michael Powell, Sept. 17, 
2002, at 1, available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf-
=pdf&id_document=6513307688. 
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consolidation had become the subject of much debate in 
Washington.326  Before the merger was approved, some 
complained that the merger would create a “monolith that would 
dominate Hispanic media and entertainment.”327  N.Y. State Sen. 
Efrain Gonzalez Jr., the President of the National Hispanic Policy 
Institute, likened Univision to Shamu and predicted “It [would] 
eat[] all the little fish.”328  Additionally, with the combined assets 
of Univision and HBC, Univision would have a “lock on two-
thirds of all Spanish-language advertising in the U.S.”329 
Many of the filings made to the FCC by Spanish Broadcasting 
System (“SBS”) argued that Spanish-language media is a separate 
media market and attempted to prove that all parties in the industry 
and even the FCC had acknowledged this fact in the past.330  SBS 
argued that despite the FCC’s general belief that television and 
radio do not compete with one another, the FCC needed to address 
competitive connections in advertising between Spanish-language 
television and Spanish-language radio.331 
SBS contended that Spanish-language radio stations need to 
advertise on Spanish-language television to be able to capture a 
significant audience.332  If the merger were approved, SBS did not 
want Univision to discriminate against other radio stations and 
refuse to sell advertising to them, as competitors of HBC.333 
SBS demonstrated this interconnectedness between Spanish-
language radio and television by submitting Univision and HBC 
marketing materials which each individually stressed that they 
 
 326 See Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy & Sen. James Jeffords to Chairman Michael 
Powell, FCC (May 20, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235) at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod-
/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); see Ballve, supra note 194, at 20. 
 327 Ballve, supra note 194, at 20. 
 328 James & Leeds, supra note 170, at 1(quoting N.Y. State Sen. Efrain Gonzalez Jr.). 
 329 Id. at 1. 
 330 See supra text accompanying notes 340–46. 
 331 Letter from Philip L. Verveer & Bruce A. Eisen, Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. 
Dortch, Secretary of the FCC (June 3, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 332 Id.  SBS claimed that to launch several of its own radio stations, it needed to launch 
numerous expensive advertising campaigns on Spanish-language television stations. Id. 
 333 Id. at 2. 
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“compet[e] with each other for advertising revenue.”334  Here, 
HBC and Univision took the perspective that, for advertising 
purposes, Spanish language radio and television were 
substitutable.335  SBS submitted a Lehman Brothers report which 
stated that, from 1991 to 2002, Spanish language radio ad revenue 
had lost ground in its competition with Spanish-language 
television.336  SBS reasoned that the competitive reality of the 
Spanish-language market was that Spanish-language radio and 
television compete with one another. 
SBS submitted statements from over twenty advertising 
agencies and advertisers who all agreed that English-language 
broadcasting and Spanish-language broadcasting constitute 
separate markets.337  One advertising sales executive who had been 
involved with Spanish-language media for forty-two years 
acknowledged several situations where advertisements were pulled 
because the buyer did not want to buy “Spanish radio” but radio or 
“television not Spanish television.”338  A thirty-one year 
advertising veteran noted that advertisers in the Spanish-language 
 
 334 Letter from Philip L. Verveer et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch, (June 
16, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 6, available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod-
/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514183066 (last visited Nov. 4, 
2004). 
 335 Id. 
 336 Letter from Philip L. Verveer et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch, (June 
23, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 2, available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov-
/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514282032 (last visited Nov. 
4, 2004). 
 337 Letter from Philip L. Verveer & Bruce A. Eisen (June 3, 2003), supra note 331.  
Jeffrey H. Smulyan, Chairman and CEO of Emmis Communications Corp. stated that in 
his twenty-five years of radio experience “English language and Spanish language radio 
stations do not generally compete with each other” and advertising markets and budgets 
are totally separate. Letter from Jeffrey H. Smulyan to Secretary Marlene H. Dortch, 
Secretary of the FCC (July 11, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).  His radio 
stations do not take into consideration the Spanish-language stations when setting their ad 
rates. Id.  See Letter from Philip L. Verveer et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. 
Dortch, Secretary of the FCC, Declaration of Alan Sokol (July 14, 2003) (Proceeding 02-
235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). 
 338 Letter from Philip L. Verveer & Bruce A. Eisen, Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. 
Dortch (June 2, 2003), at 6–7 (referring to letter from Eduardo Caballero to Chairman 
Michael Powell, May 27, 2003), available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov-
/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514156470. 
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market often substituted Spanish-language television and Spanish-
language radio but did not shift advertising from English to 
Spanish or Spanish to English just because of price changes.339  
These advertising business customs reflect a marketplace where 
Spanish-language radio is interchangeable with Spanish-language 
television.  This demonstrates a flexibility between radio and 
television unseen in English-language media, because of the 
unique variant of audience language. 
SBS, submitted cases in which the FCC itself recognized the 
“specialized status of Spanish and other minority languages” 
therefore the designation of separate Spanish-language media 
market would be in line with Commission precedent.340  SBS 
argued that the idea that Spanish-language is merely a format was 
undermined by thirty years of FCC decisions.341  The FCC had, on 
several occasions, protected Spanish-language media by specific 
regulations namely, the spot sales waiver,342 cable carriage 
specialty signals, the must-carry rules, newspaper/broadcast 
television cross-ownership rules343 and in two specific cases that 
Univision cited in its filings, Spanish Radio Network and Brawley 
Broadcasting.344  SBS argued that the Commission’s position in 
Spanish Radio Network could be viewed as the multiple ownership 
rules are based on evaluating market concentration and entry 
 
 339 Id. at 4–5 (referring to letter from Castor A. Fernandez to Chairman Michael Powell, 
May 27, 2003). 
 340 See Letter from David M. Don, Counsel for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary of 
the FCC, Ex Parte Presentation to Commissioner Copps (June 17, 2003) (Proceeding 02-
235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). 
 341 Letter from Michael G. Jones et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch, 
Secretary of the FCC (June 26, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). 
 342 See supra notes 127–56 and accompanying text. 
 343 Letter from David M. Don (June 17, 2003), supra note 340.  The presentation cited 
the case of Telemundo Communications Inc., 17 F.C.C.R. 6958 (2002); see supra notes 
115–26 and accompanying text for more information on this opinion.  They also noted 
cable carriage history. See supra notes 157–64 and accompanying text. 
 344 Letter from Michael G. Jones et al. (June 26, 2003), supra note 341.  SBS also noted 
that in Brawley Broadcasting, 13 F.C.C.R. 21119 (1998), the FCC’s decision to waive the 
one-to-a-market rule for Entravision was due in part to the anticipated creation of 
improved Spanish-language programming options. Id. 
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barriers in English language broadcasting only345 and they are not 
designed to properly assess Spanish language media.346  SBS 
argued that through the business practices of advertising, through 
the language of the targeted audiences, and throughout FCC 
precedent, Spanish-language media could be distinguished as a 
separate media market and needed to be regulated as such. 
Telemundo made ex parte presentations to the Commissioners 
opposing the Univision merger on the grounds of its impact on 
diversity and competition.347  Telemundo’s concerns focused on the 
potential anticompetitive effects of the merger.348  Much like SBS, 
it didn’t want to be denied access to advertising opportunities on 
HBC radio stations because it had been denied access to 
Entravision stations before.349  Telemundo sought merger 
conditions that would protect competitive access to talent and radio 
promotion and prohibit joint sales.350  Collectively, the parties 
against the merger demonstrated that the merger was not in the 
public interest and significant anticompetitive harms would arise 
from it.351  Even though SBS was a competitor of HBC, it raised 
evidence of FCC precedent to support its thesis that Spanish-
language media existed as a separate and distinct market apart 
from English-language media and the FCC itself had recognized 
that before.352  The FCC reviewed the comments filed by SBS, 
Univision, Telemundo, Congressmen, Senators, and the public at 
large to conclude that the merger of Univision and HBC was in the 
public interest.353 
 
 345 Letter from Philip L. Verveer et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch (June 
26, 2003), at 2, available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?-
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514282534. 
 346 Id. 
 347 Letter from F. William LeBeau, Counsel to Telemundo, to Marlene Dortch, 
Secretary of the FCC, Ex Parte Presentation (Aug. 21, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). 
 348 Id. 
 349 Id. 
 350 Id. 
 351 See supra notes 320–50 and accompanying text. 
 352 See supra notes 330–46 and accompanying text. 
 353 See infra notes 354–412 and accompanying text. 
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C. Final FCC Review of the Merger of Univision and HBC 
The FCC approached the merger as the Justice Department did, 
under the perspective that it was simply a transfer of radio 
assets,354 and it maintained its longtime stance that radio and 
television advertising do not compete with each other.355  
Therefore the only competitive review required was in the radio 
market.356  The FCC looked to the broadcast ownership rules to 
determine whether the license transfers would be permissible under 
the competitive guidelines laid out in the rules.357  In the end, it 
decided that Spanish-language media should not be considered a 
separate media market for broadcast ownership purposes. 
1. Broadcast Ownership Rules 
Because the merger would result in a combination of Univision 
television assets and HBC radio assets in overlap markets, the FCC 
applied the radio-television cross-ownership rule358 and found that 
the all the license transfers were permissible.359  Univision 
complied in most areas with local radio ownership rule,360 but in 
two markets, Houston and Albuquerque, Univision would own one 
more station than was permitted.361  The FCC required divestiture 
of the two stations within six months if the stay of judgment was 
 
 354 See supra text accompanying note 246 (stating that the relevant product market was 
Spanish-language radio advertising). 
 355 The FCC has “generally assumed, in [their] competition analyses of radio 
transactions, that radio and television stations do not compete in the same product 
market, an approach the DOJ has generally followed.” Univision License Transfer, supra 
note 129, ¶ 59, at *68. 
 356 Id. 
 357 Id. ¶¶ 7–11, at **8–16. 
 358 Id. ¶¶ 7–8, at **8–9.  Note that the 2002 Biennial Review eliminated the radio-
television cross-ownership rule.  3 ZUCKMAN, supra note 10, § 14.4, at 50.  At this point 
in the Commission’s review they are using the old rules.  See 3 ZUCKMAN, supra note 10, 
§ 14.4, at 47,49,51, 155–59 (West Prac. ed. 1999 & Supp. 2004) (describing the 
newspaper-broadcast and broadcast-cable cross-ownership rule). 
 359 Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 9, at *12. 
 360 The Commission noted in the Univision decision that it was applying the new 2002 
biennial rules for the radio multiple ownership part of the Univision merger. Id. ¶ 11, at 
**15–16.  But it did not apply the new rules for the cross-ownership section of the 
decision.  See supra note 358. 
 361 Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 11, at **15–16.  Univision would 
control six FM stations and one AM station. Id. 
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lifted by the Third Circuit in the Prometheus Radio Project case or 
the 2002 biennial rules went into effect.362 
2. Attribution 
Since the FCC must review the broadcaster’s ownership it will 
determine what parties have an ownership stake in the entity.  The 
only owners that will be considered attributable for purposes of the 
FCC ownership rules, however, are those that confer a “degree of 
influence or control such that the holders [of such control] have a 
realistic potential to affect the programming decisions of licensees 
or other core operating functions.”363  The National Hispanic 
Policy Institute (“NHPI”) filed a petition to deny against the 
merger and focused mainly on the “relationships between Clear 
Channel, HBC, Univision and Entravision”364 and their attributable 
interests.365  NHPI was concerned about Clear Channel’s “26 
percent nonvoting equity interest in HBC”366 and Univision’s 
ownership of 9.86% of Entravision’s voting stock.367  NHPI was 
troubled that separation of ownership between these companies 
was an illusion and that Univision would continue to control 
Entravision, while Clear Channel would exercise control over 
HBC.368  The FCC reviewed the attributable control of 
shareholders within Univision and HBC.  Overall, the Commission 
did not find a problem with Clear Channel’s ownership interest in 
HBC.369  Though after the merger Clear Channel’s non-voting 
 
 362 Id. ¶ 11, at *16 (noting, however, that this decision was under the new ownership 
rules that were under a stay of execution at the time they were applied).  Yet one year 
later, the new local television rule was partially remanded to the Commission by the 
Third Circuit because the numerical limits set by the FCC were not well-reasoned or 
supported. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 420 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 363 In the Matter of Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Attribution of 
Broadcast and Cable/MDS Interests, 14 F.C.C.R. 12559, ¶ 1, 12560 (Aug. 6, 1999). 
 364 Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 12, at *16. 
 365 Id. ¶ 12, at *16. 
 366 Id. ¶ 13, at *19. 
 367 Id. ¶ 37, at *44. 
 368 Id. ¶ 12, at *16. 
 369 Id. ¶¶ 28–29, at *35.  Clear Channel’s interest in HBC had been previously reviewed 
by the Commission, which found that the interest was not attributable. Id. ¶ 13, at *19.  
However, Clear Channel itself has attracted attention from federal authorities because of 
the immense growth of its radio holdings since the passage of the Telecom Act of 1996. 
See Alicia Mundy, Score One for Regulators, CABLE WORLD, Jul. 28, 2003, at 3 
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interest in HBC would be converted into a 3.66% voting stock 
interest in Univision,370 any voting interest below 5% is considered 
nonattributable under FCC rules.371 
NHPI also raised ire over Clear Channel’s appointees on 
HBC’s Board of Directors.372  However, the FCC determined that 
the two appointees at issue had been independently elected to the 
board,373 and that there was no evidence to support allegations that 
it would influence the HBC Board on behalf of Clear Channel.374  
NHPI argued that Clear Channel would have de facto control over 
HBC and would exercise the same over Univision,375 but the FCC 
found that NHPI’s petition to deny failed to raise a “substantial and 
material question of fact.”376 
 
(remarking that Clear Channel played a large role in the media consolidation debate, 
especially in Congress, where it was viewed as “the poster child for Big Media Gone 
Bad.  Almost every member of Congress cited Clear Channel as the bete noir that spurred 
their vote.”).  Clear Channel, the industry leader in radio station ownership, owned thirty-
six radio stations before the passage of the 1996 Act, and by 2003, 1225 stations. Jeff 
Leeds, Clear Channel: An Empire Built on Deregulation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at 
B1.  The allegations NHPI made of anti-competitive behavior on the part of Clear 
Channel in its dealings with SBS were dismissed by the FCC as conclusory and 
unsupported.  Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶¶ 28–29, at *35. 
 370 Id. ¶ 14, at **20–21. 
 371 Id.  Clear Channel would also comply with the FCC’s rule on Equity/Debt for 
attribution.  Here attribution can attach if an “investor either (1) supplies over 15% of a 
station’s total weekly broadcast programming hours, or (2) is a same-market media entity 
subject to the broadcast multiple ownership rules, its interest in the licensee or other 
media entity in that market will be attributable if that interest, aggregating both debt and 
equity, exceeds 33% of the total asset value of the licensee or media entity.” Id. at *21 
(citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555, Note 2(a) (2003)).  Clear Channel argued that its combined 
debt and equity would not exceed 33% and NHPI did not proffer evidence to rebut this. 
Id. 
 372 Id. ¶ 16, at *23.  The Commission considers “an investor’s relationship to an entity’s 
Board of Directors” when ascertaining the potential attribution of influence. Id. 
 373 Id. ¶ 18, at *24.  “They work for financial institutions that provided banking services 
for Clear Channel.” Id. 
 374 Id. ¶ 18, at *25. 
 375 Id. ¶ 19, at *25.  This too was previously argued in Shareholders AMFM Inc. and 
dismissed. Id. ¶ 19, at *26. 
 376 Id. ¶ 25, at **31–32.  NHPI failed to explain how Clear Channel’s 3.66 percent 
voting interest could be overcome by Univision’s single-majority shareholder, Jerrold 
Perenchio. Id. 
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Both NHPI and the FCC had initial concerns over Univision’s 
governance and control of Entravision,377 but the DOJ addressed 
many of these concerns in its Consent Decree.378  The FCC 
concluded that compliance with the DOJ decree would cause all 
relevant concerns as to Univision’s control of Entravision to be 
moot.379  Even though the FCC attributed Entravision television to 
Univision, Univision was still in compliance with the 
radio/television cross-ownership rule.380  NHPI challenged the 
Commission’s findings,381 but the FCC determined that 
Univision’s interest in Entravision did not exceed 33% and 
therefore complied with the FCC attribution standard.382 
3. Monopoly 
Beyond the petitions to deny proffered by NHPI, Elgin FM 
Limited Partnership (“Elgin”) raised informal objections in the 
Univision proceeding.383  Elgin owned three radio stations which 
competed with HBC in Texas and was concerned that the merger 
would create “a Spanish language media monopoly.”384  Elgin’s 
fears were that Clear Channel’s dominant ownership of 
entertainment venues, combined with Univision’s influence in 
music entertainment, would prevent an unaffiliated company like 
Elgin, from being involved with a music event or creating 
synergies that could compete with “‘media giants’ Univision and 
Clear Channel.”385  The Commission again did not find that Elgin 
 
 377 Id. ¶¶ 39, 43, at *45, **49–50 (revealing that the FCC staff requested further 
information from Univision to determine attribution).  NHPI argued that the rights 
retained by Univision would not only be attributable, but would also give Univision de 
facto control over Entravision. Id. ¶ 41, at *46. 
 378 Id. ¶ 40, at *46. 
 379 Id. ¶ 41, at *47. 
 380 Id. (noting that Univision also would comply with the new 2002 biennial cross-
media limits). 
 381 NHPI argued that because “Univision acts as Entravision’s exclusive national 
advertising representative firm,” Univision’s continued influence should demand 
attribution. Id. ¶ 49, at *58.  However, the FCC no longer uses advertising representation 
as a guideline for attribution. Id. ¶ 50, at *59.  Instead, it uses the EDP standard to 
consider attribution. Id.  See supra note 371 (explaining the Equity Debt Plus standard). 
 382 Id. ¶ 47, at *56. 
 383 Id. ¶ 52, at *60. 
 384 Id. ¶ 52, at *60. 
 385 Id. ¶ 52, at *61. 
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argued with the requisite specificity.386  Even in arguing that the 
merger is anti-competitive, Elgin did not argue how “Univision 
[would] be able to control Spanish language entertainment as a 
whole” and how Elgin would be harmed.387 
The FCC also dismissed the concerns over anti-competitive 
behavior raised by Telemundo and the Media Access Project 
(“MAP”).388  The MAP and Telemundo’s accusations involved 
Univision’s policy that made it hard for “competitors to hire 
Univision’s TV personalities or obtain marquee programming.”389  
Newspaper reports suggested that Univision personalities were not 
permitted to appear on Telemundo under any circumstances.390  
There were allegations of Univision “preclud[ing Telemundo] 
from promoting its programming on Entravision’s radio 
stations.”391  However, the Commission was “not convinced that 
the practices alleged by Telemundo and MAP, even if true, 
[would] translate into competitive harms.”392 
4. Separate Media Market 
The FCC believed SBS was arguing for a Spanish-language 
submarket and advocating for the FCC to review the effects of the 
merger on Spanish-speaking audiences.393  Under those 
circumstances, the FCC refused “to limit or condition [its] 
approval of this transaction on the basis of [the] purported impact 
on Spanish-speaking audiences.” 394  The FCC found that SBS did 
not make a strong enough argument to overcome the 
Commission’s longtime “reluctance to define product markets 
based on programming format or language.”395  The Commission 
 
 386 Id. ¶ 53, at *61. 
 387 Id. ¶ 54, at *63. 
 388 Id. ¶ 54, at *64 n.107. 
 389 Id. 
 390 Porter, supra note 181, at B1. 
 391 Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 54, at *64 n.107. 
 392 Id. ¶¶ 56–57, at **66–67. 
 393 Id. ¶ 57, at *67. 
 394 Id. 
 395 Id. ¶ 58, at *67; see Part I.B.2 ( discussing the history of format disputes and the 
Commission’s current stance). But see Part I.B (demonstrating the Commission’s past 
considerations of language in media regulation). 
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also restated its longstanding belief that radio and television 
stations do not compete in the same product market, which is also 
consistent with the DOJ’s position.396  The FCC refuted evidence 
of a separate Spanish-language media market as anecdotal and 
unconvincing.397  Since Univision did not own any radio stations, 
the merger with HBC would not create undue radio 
concentration.398 
If the Spanish-language media market was deemed separate, a 
proper competitive analysis would include the other market 
participants and the ease of entry into the market.399  The FCC 
considered Telemundo a direct and worthy competitor of 
Univision.400  With GE/NBC behind it, Telemundo would have the 
finances, resources and expertise to compete in this market.401  
Even if the FCC was concerned with competition in a separate 
Spanish-language media market, Telemundo was sufficient 
competition. 
In determining diversity, the FCC examined all of the media 
outlets that target Hispanics.402  The FCC argued that bilingual 
viewers have more outlets and alternatives for viewpoints than the 
rest of the population.403  Even looking only at Spanish-language 
programming, there was not a “single gatekeeper” to diversity, 
with the existence of local Spanish newspapers, Spanish radio, 
Second Audio Program television broadcasting, and cable/satellite 
options.404  The FCC contended that programming available to 
Spanish-speaking audiences today is growing and substantial405 
and expected that cable would provide many more Spanish outlets 
in the future.406  The FCC found that barriers to entry in Spanish-
language radio had been demonstrably low, as evinced by the 
 
 396 Id. ¶ 59, at *68. 
 397 Id. 
 398 Id. ¶ 59, at *69. 
 399 Id. ¶ 60, at *70. 
 400 Id. 
 401 Id. 
 402 Id. ¶ 62, at *73. 
 403 Id. ¶ 63, at *76 (based on statistics collected by the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute). 
 404 Id. ¶ 64, at *76. 
 405 Id. ¶ 60, at *70. 
 406 Id. ¶ 60, at *71. 
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increased number of radio stations introduced in the Spanish 
format between 2001 and 2002.407  The Commission’s study found 
that 163 stations switched to the Spanish-language format.408  The 
FCC viewed this as evidence that entry into the Spanish-language 
radio market was not difficult at all: a radio station owner could 
simply buy an English-language station and convert the format 
from English to Spanish. 
After consideration of evidence from both advocates and 
detractors of the merger, the FCC approved the license transfer 
finding it was in public interest and convenience.409  It found there 
were no barriers to entry in the market,410 diversity would not be 
undermined,411 and there would be no shortage of media outlets 
available to Spanish speaking audiences.412  Univision, in one 
single moment, became the leading Spanish-language television 
company and radio company, and with that, one more market 
player left the playing field.  Part III recognizes that this moment 
was a step in the wrong direction for the FCC, an abandonment of 
the public interest, and ignorance of the fact that Spanish-language 
audiences would seriously be affected by this change.  Varied 
ownership leads to viewpoint diversity.  The FCC consistently 
repeats this mantra, however Spanish-language ownership is less 
varied today and viewpoint diversity is even more shallow. 
III. WHY THE UNIVISION MERGER WAS A FAILURE IN THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 
The FCC’s approval of the Univision merger was not in the 
public interest.  The FCC did not take into consideration 
competition, localism and diversity for the audience affected by the 
merger—the Spanish-speaking audience.  All FCC decisions must 
be well-reasoned and Part III will show that the FCC’s reasoning in 
the Univision merger was flawed and implausible.  The FCC did 
 
 407 Id. ¶ 61, at *72. 
 408 Id. 
 409 Id. ¶ 67, at *79. 
 410 Id. ¶ 65, at *78. 
 411 Id. ¶ 67, at *79. 
 412 Id. ¶ 65, at *78. 
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not properly consider the arguments presented to them by the 
Department of Justice, academic scholars, market participants or 
the consuming public.  It even contradicted its own history.  
Spanish-language media forms a unique and distinct market and 
the FCC blatantly chose to ignore this evidence. 
A. Language as a Factor of Analysis 
The FCC could have looked to its earlier holdings and 
recognized that language plays a vital role in regulatory decisions.  
Despite the FCC claims that it does not use language as a factor for 
ownership analysis, it has used this standard on numerous 
occasions. 
1. Diversity and Competition 
The FCC has stated that “[t]hose whose primary language is 
not English deserve the same protections of diversity and 
competition as do English speakers”413 and in the 2002 biennial 
review, the FCC announced its intention to focus on the effects of 
competition on the public,414  since its “duty as an agency runs to 
consumers.”415  The FCC failed, however, to apply these two 
policies, in tandem, to the Univision merger.  Spanish-speaking 
consumers were not the focus of the FCC’s competition analysis.  
In the Univision merger, all consumers were included in the FCC’s 
evaluation because it improperly defined the merger’s market 
based on a language-neutral audience.416  But a broadcaster’s 
audience, and how it is targeted, is based on language when the 
broadcast language is Spanish.  The FCC has acknowledged that 
Spanish broadcasting only attracts and interests those who speak 
the language.417  The Commission has said that “a program 
broadcast in a foreign language is of little interest to any but those 
fluent, in the language.”418  Audience reach cannot be calculated as 
language-neutral if the audience attracted is only those fluent and 
 
 413 Biennial Review 2002, supra note 4, ¶ 458, at 13800. 
 414 Id. ¶ 56, at 13638. 
 415 Id. ¶ 68, at 13641. 
 416 See supra text accompanying note 394. 
 417 See supra text accompanying notes 160–61. 
 418 See Amend. of pt. 76, supra note 162, ¶ 24, at 452. 
SERRATORE 1/25/2005  6:15 PM 
260 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:203 
interested in the language—the Spanish-speaking audience.  It is 
not an accurate measure of an audience if you count the many 
Americans who do not speak Spanish in the measure of 
Univision’s audience reach.  Univision is not targeting those 
consumers who don’t speak Spanish, so the FCC should not 
include them in their analysis of the merger.  In fact, the FCC 
refused to find out if there was an impact on Spanish-speaking 
audiences.419  The Congressional Hispanic Caucus asked the 
Commission to “carefully review the full impact that this merger 
will have on the Hispanic community,”420 but the FCC refused.421  
The FCC cannot execute competition and diversity inquiries for 
English-language audiences alone and still claim the merger is in 
the public interest.422  The FCC cannot continue to exclude 
language from broadcast ownership decisions if diversity and 
competition are to be accurately measured for all audiences, 
including Spanish-speaking ones. 
The FCC has recognized how different the competitive market 
is for Spanish-language broadcasters.423  That concern fueled the 
special privileges the FCC granted to NBC in 2002 when NBC 
merged with Telemundo.424  When ABC merged with Disney, the 
FCC forced ABC to divest its extra TV station in six months 
because of concerns over competition and excess control of 
advertising in the L.A. market.425  But when NBC faced the same 
problem, in the same market, it was given twice the time to divest 
because of the Spanish-language stations involved in its’ merger.426  
Excess concentration and control were not Commission concerns 
because there was no competition between the NBC and 
Telemundo stations due to the different language of the 
broadcasts.427  It is contradictory to find that NBC would not 
 
 419 See supra text accompanying note 394. 
 420 Letter from Rep. Robert Menendez et al., to Chairman Michael Powell, Sept. 17, 
2002, at 1, available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf-
=pdf&id_document=6513307688. 
 421 See supra text accompanying note 394. 
 422 See Biennial Review 2002, supra note 4. 
 423 See supra Part I.B.4. 
 424 See supra text accompanying notes 122–26. 
 425 See supra text accompanying notes 120–21121. 
 426 See supra text accompanying notes 122, 126. 
 427 See supra text accompanying notes 124–25. 
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compete with Telemundo in that merger and then argue that 
Univision competes with all the other English-language 
broadcasters in America.  Language changes the competitive 
environment for media companies and the FCC cannot recognize 
this in 2002, but ignore it in 2003. 
2. Spanish-Language Community Programming Needs 
To exclude language in the Univision merger was inconsistent 
with prior FCC findings that sought to protect the needs of 
Spanish-language audiences in other contexts.428  The FCC has 
recognized community need and the public benefit of foreign 
language media on numerous occasions.429  From the earliest days 
of broadcasting, the FCC commended beneficial, foreign-language 
broadcasting in America.430  The FCC has even demanded foreign-
language broadcast service in communities that lack such an 
outlet.431  In La Fiesta, it selected the broadcaster who would 
provide a full-time Spanish-language radio service, not the one 
would provide a part-time service.432  In the KEVT decision, the 
Commission admitted that the Spanish-language nighttime radio 
service was needed in that community and it was willing to waive 
other rules to provide for the service.433 
The FCC’s longtime “reluctance to define product markets 
based on programming format or language”434 is not a valid policy 
when it results in an abandonment of the regulatory responsibility 
of protecting the public interest.435  The Supreme Court approved 
the FCC’s use of the market to regulate entertainment formats, 
however it cautioned a blanket application of such a rule.436  The 
Supreme Court said that “the Commission should be alert to the 
consequences of its policies and should stand ready to alter its rule 
 
 428 See supra Part I.B.1–5. 
 429 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 430 See supra text accompanying notes 68–69. 
 431 See supra text accompanying notes 80–81. 
 432 See supra text accompanying notes 72–81. 
 433 See supra text accompanying notes 102–03. 
 434 Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 58, at *67. 
 435 See supra text accompanying notes 92–93. 
 436 See supra text accompanying notes 92–93. 
SERRATORE 1/25/2005  6:15 PM 
262 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:203 
if necessary to serve the public interest more fully.”437  
Notwithstanding the argument that Spanish-language media is 
simply a format, the FCC still has the ability and duty to review 
entertainment format changes to ensure the public interest is 
served.438 
More importantly, it cannot be argued that Spanish-language 
broadcasting is a mere entertainment format when it acts as the 
primary source of local news for Spanish-speakers.439  The 
language of an audience affects information and resource choices 
more than a musical preference.  One can access local news 
without having to listen to classical music or jazz.  As Judge 
Bazelon stated in the KEVT decision: “there is a crucial difference 
between failure to serve a group which cannot understand the 
language broadcasted, and a failure to reach a group which 
chooses not to listen because of program content.”440  The FCC has 
a duty to regulate in the public interest to protect audiences who 
are not being served.  The FCC has a record of protecting Spanish-
language audiences who are not being served, but it abandoned this 
audience when it approved the Univision merger.441 
3. Network Representation Waiver—A Separate Policy for 
Spanish-Language Broadcasters 
The most controversial stance taken by the FCC  in this debate 
is its granting of the permanent waiver of the network 
representation rule for only Spanish-language broadcasters, even 
when a judge questioned this practice as anticompetitive and no 
longer necessary in the public interest.442  If the waiver of the 
network representation rule still operates based on the language of 
the broadcasters, the FCC cannot pretend that the Univision merger 
existed in a language-neutral marketplace.  This waiver is evidence 
of the already existing separate media marketplace of Spanish-
language broadcasting.  There is no question that language and 
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advertising competition are central to the FCC’s application of the 
waiver.443  The FCC, in granting the network representation rule 
waiver, acknowledged a fundamental difference in the business, 
advertising, and structure of Spanish-language media as compared 
to English-language media.  These are competitive differences that 
the FCC does not recognize for any other type of broadcaster.  The 
common thread amongst the waiver recipients is the language of 
their broadcasts.  It is inconsistent to recognize this language 
distinction in such cases, but not in broadcast ownership decisions. 
The waiver is no longer appropriate for Univision, because it 
was originally issued to assist fledgling entities.444  In 2003, 
Univision’s profits were $349 million and it no longer qualifies as 
fledgling.445  Univision no longer needs the FCC to support its 
development and growth in the same way it did in 1978.  The 
waiver was intended to “encourage[e] the growth and development 
of new networks; foste[r] foreign-language programming; 
increase[e] programming diversity; strengthe[n] competition 
among stations; and foste[r] a competitive UHF service.”446  
Certainly Univision can no longer argue that it is a new network.447  
Univision, founded in 1961, is the fifth largest network putting it 
ahead of UPN and the WB.448  Competition is not served by 
extending the waiver privilege to Univision.  Univision has been so 
well-protected that the Administrative Law Judge’s premonition 
about the anticompetitive effects of this waiver have come true.449  
Univision argued in defense of the waiver that no other sales 
representative competed with it and no competitor could take its 
place if the waiver was lifted.450  In 1978, there actually was one 
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other sales representative competing with Univision 451 but now 
Univision alone controls the market.  Protected by this waiver, 
Univision has successfully dominated the market in spot sales for 
its own affiliates for over 25 years.  Faced with this evidence of 
anticompetitive harm, the FCC still did not withdraw the waiver. 
This is a separate policy for Spanish-language broadcasters 
that is not applied equally to other broadcasters.  Yet it is a policy 
that Univision seeks to protect, not for itself, but for Entravision, 
the company it is a competitor of in radio, but an ally with in 
television.452  Entravision, as owner of Univision affiliates, should 
be free to make its own arguments for the benefits of the waiver.  
The fact that Univision argued for the protection of the rule on 
behalf of Entravision suggests that Entravision’s affiliate 
independence is questionable.  The rule was initially created to 
prevent this kind of network control over affiliates.453  Univision 
does not deserve this unique protection when it claims the 
language of its broadcasts qualifies it for special privileges in one 
area of business, but denies that language is a factor when used in a 
definition for another of its ventures. 
This record of FCC decisions demonstrates that language is, 
and has always been, a factor in FCC decisions and must be taken 
into consideration when media mergers affect foreign-language 
audiences.  Language affects the market, advertising and 
competition—all matters that are integral to the broadcast 
ownership review. 
B. Unique Use of Spanish-Language Media 
The merger has given the FCC a significant record of studies, 
statistics, and anecdotes of participants in the market of Spanish-
language media that refutes the FCC’s conclusion that Spanish-
language media functions in the same way as English-language 
media.454  Spanish-language media cannot be substituted with 
English-language media merely because Spanish-speaking 
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audiences “use” the content differently and because of presentation 
style and focus.455  Since the broadcast ownership rules are 
premised on serving and protecting consumers,456 the FCC must 
address how Spanish-language consumers interact with their 
media. 
1. Viewpoint Diversity Cannot Include Cable 
When one only speaks Spanish or prefers to hear local news in 
Spanish, ones media choices are automatically limited and that 
changes the dynamic of viewpoint diversity for a significant 
portion of the population.  The FCC has considered that many 
different media outlets can contribute to viewpoint diversity 
including broadcast television, radio, newspapers, cable and the 
internet.457  The FCC, however, has said “Not all voices. . .speak 
with the same volume.”458  Despite the fact that these sources of 
viewpoint diversity add to the public’s choices,459 all these media 
do not offer the same benefits to consumers460 nor are they 
accessible to all people.461  Since local news programming is the 
FCC’s indicator of viewpoint diversity,462 it has concluded that 
each of these media cannot be considered of equal weight when 
examining a local news service.463  Specifically, the FCC found 
that cable cannot be a complete substitute for broadcast stations 
and newspapers as sources of local news464 because one third of 
Americans are not cable subscribers and only 30% of cable 
subscribers “have access to local cable news channels.”465  Those 
local cable channels only reach 10-15% of cable systems 
nationwide and of the twenty-two local cable news channels 
available, five serve the New York City area.466  The FCC decided 
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that since cable still lacks significant local news options, it is not a 
trustworthy measure of viewpoint diversity and excluded it from a 
calculation of market diversity.467 
In spite of the above facts, the FCC took the stance that a 
merger of Univision and HBC would not harm market diversity468 
because of the plethora of programming choices available through 
cable and satellite sources for Spanish-language audiences.469 It is 
well known, however, that cable subscriptions rates for Hispanic 
households are lower than non-Hispanic households.470  The FCC 
does not justify how cable overall cannot be a sufficient source of 
viewpoint diversity, but it can be for Spanish-language audiences 
who have less access to cable.  The FCC rationalized their decision 
by saying that there would be future cable options for the Hispanic 
population, but such offerings do not yet exist.  There is no 
justification for the FCC’s  argument that Spanish-language 
audiences have enough viewing choices now based upon future, 
hypothetical programming.  The FCC cannot analyze competition 
and diversity in a market today by counting theoretical 
programming.  The FCC also can’t rely on cable as a substitute for 
free broadcasting when cable subscriptions are far less prevalent in 
Hispanic households.  FCC’s rationale to include cable in its 
calculation of diversity for audiences affected by the Univision 
merger lacks credibility under this analysis.   
2. English-Language Programming Just Doesn’t Translate 
The FCC relied on the availability of SAP to increase 
programming choices for Spanish-language audiences in the 
Univision decision.471  However, statistics have shown that only 
42% of Hispanic households are cognizant of SAP’s existence and 
only 1 in 6 of these households use it with any frequency.472  If no 
one is using it, then it can’t be a substitute for Spanish-language 
broadcasting, nor a measure for diversity in the Spanish-language 
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market.  More importantly, SAP only provides access to translated 
English-language programming, and studies have shown that those 
translations are not the same thing as programming designed for 
Spanish-language audiences.473 This is especially critical when 
looking at local news.474  If local news is the barometer of a 
diverse and competitive media market, and translations of English-
language news into Spanish have proved to be unworthy and 
unwatched,475 then the Spanish-language audiences are not being 
served by these English-language broadcasters and cannot be 
considered part of the marketplace of choices available to Spanish 
audiences.  Just translating English broadcasts into Spanish does 
not make the news more accessible if the news itself is not 
pertinent to the viewers.  Hispanic audiences prefer Spanish-
language news broadcasts.476  Those broadcasts reflect issues not 
covered on English-language news.477  Even Univision itself says 
cultural preferences for Spanish-language programming are the 
reason behind Univision’s dominance in the Hispanic ratings.478  
The FCC cannot include SAP, which marginally opens up English-
language programming to Spanish-language audiences, as a 
guarantor of market diversity.  The FCC improperly included cable 
and SAP in the market definition used in the Univision merger and 
in doing so counted improper programming as evidence of 
diversity and competition in the affected market. 
3. Advertising Marketplace Differences 
The FCC heard from a number of market participants that the 
advertising market for Spanish-language media revolves around 
language and not media formats.  Ad buyers will move from 
Spanish-language television to Spanish-language radio based on 
price changes, but will not move from Spanish to English or 
English to Spanish in any media.479  Even the DOJ, which only 
analyzed how the merger would lessen market competition, 
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defined the market in Univision as Spanish-language radio 
advertising.480  Language was a critical factor used to assess the 
actual behavior of advertisers in the market and to analyze the 
potential harm for the market.  The DOJ found that advertisers did 
not consider Spanish-language radio to be a “reasonable substitute” 
for non-Spanish-language radio.481  The DOJ recognized that 
language is the linchpin between media advertising habits and 
actual market competition and it is an erroneous decision for the 
FCC to find differently. 
4. Univision is the Market Leader—Now and Always 
Univision admits “that there is no company as dominant in 
English-language media as Univision is in Spanish.”482  No other 
competitor even approaches the market position that Univision 
held before the merger and certainly not after the merger.483  The 
FCC was not troubled by this fact.  It allowed this clear market 
leader to grow and did not apply any limiting conditions to the 
merger.  The market was initially concentrated and this merger 
only caused this market to further shrink.  In the top ten Hispanic 
markets, there are on “average 3.3 television stations, 5.7 AM 
stations and 6 FM stations.”484  “There is no daily Spanish-
language newspaper in fourteen of the top twenty Spanish-
language markets.”485  These limited options were what the FCC 
said constituted a diverse and competitive market for Spanish-
language audiences.  The FCC did not concern itself with the loss 
of a voice from this market, because the FCC refused to even view 
it as a market.486 
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The Commission argued that the market was not dangerously 
concentrated because radio market entry was easy.  It cited as 
evidence the number of stations which went from English 
broadcasting to Spanish.487  It failed to note, however, that 
Spanish-language incumbent broadcasters conducted most of those 
conversions and488 new entrants were not involved.489  Thus, this 
concentrated market remains so following the merger. 
C. The Univision Decision Must Be Challenged 
The Univision decision cannot be allowed to rest quietly in the 
annals of FCC history.  It should be challenged so that this 
situation does not happen again.  Even though the lawsuit raised by 
NHPI to the D.C. Circuit failed for standing,490 the decision should 
be disputed.  Consolidation in Spanish-language media is already 
significant and the next merger that seeks FCC approval could be 
the death-knell for a truly diverse and competitive media market if 
the FCC continues to ignore the question of how language affects 
competition and diversity.  Spanish-language media is only the first 
stage of this fight. 
As local foreign-language communities flock to more foreign-
language programming, these issues will continue to arise.491  As 
foreign-language communities grow, Congress will have to take 
notice.492  The FCC should anticipate that these issues are not 
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fleeting and will likely occur with increasing frequency as foreign-
language media in America matures with its audiences. 
D. Broadcast Ownership Rules Must Take Language into 
Consideration 
The FCC should use the filings made to the Commission on the 
Univision merger to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and 
directly address the question of whether Spanish-language media 
should be regulated as a distinct media market.  Spanish-language 
media today is concentrated in a few companies, further 
consolidated by the Univision merger.  Media consolidation is not 
the goal of the broadcast ownership rules.  Media regulation is 
supposed to maintain a diverse and competitive media 
environment.493  The FCC has failed to do so for Spanish-language 
media. 
The next quadrennial review would be the perfect vehicle for 
this endeavor.  The 2002 biennial review has been remanded to the 
FCC and the reasoning the FCC used to design the new rules and 
approve the Univision merger needs serious repair.494  It would 
make the most sense to develop a study of Spanish-language media 
in tandem with the broadcast ownership structure and rules so that 
competition, localism and diversity are truly protected for all 
audiences. 
This change in the market definition of broadcast ownership 
rules would not result in dominant English-language companies 
asserting their influence on two levels, by purchasing both 
broadcast properties in English-language media and Spanish-
language media.  New rules should be promulgated so that the 
FCC looks to Spanish-language concentration on the local level 
and at the same time maintains a national cap on audience reach 
that would include both Spanish and English-language media.  The 
rule should promote truly new entrants in the market and not 
encourage a company at the outer limits of ownership in the 
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English-language market to expand into Spanish-language media.  
The Commission should set a diversity and concentration value for 
Spanish-language stations when the broadcaster has English-
language holdings, and when the broadcaster only has Spanish-
language stations.  The goal of these new rules should be to protect 
Spanish-language audiences against media consolidation in 
Spanish outlets.  Within these rules however, English-language 
media giants should not be permitted to skirt overall ownership 
limits and grow bigger with Spanish-language holdings. 
The new rules should allow companies with culturally relevant 
programming in the Spanish-language market to develop a 
business on par with English-language companies, even with the 
application of a market definition based on language.  But these 
companies must realize that media consolidation is not the 
exclusive domain of the English-language market.  If a company 
chooses to enter the Spanish-language market, its ownership 
control must be monitored so that the public interest benefits that 
run to its Spanish-speaking consumers can be determined. 
CONCLUSION 
The FCC should revise its media ownership rules to allow for 
language as an element of its formula to assess competition, 
localism and diversity in the public interest.  The Commission has 
a duty and an obligation to all Americans to act in the public 
interest when regulating the broadcast spectrum.  Spanish speakers 
deserve equal treatment and consideration from a Commission that 
congratulates itself on its noble goals of competition, localism and 
diversity.  These goals should apply equally to all. 
 
